Press Releases - Financial Services Commission

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Mar 13, 2009

Preemptive Initiatives to Safeguard the Soundness of Financial Instituitions

1. BackgroundAmid deteriorating financial climate in the global economy, much uncertainty in global financial markets has also escalated. Thus, the Korean economy is likely to suffer a prolonged recession, potentially triggering an economic vicious circle starting with corporate and house-hold loan defaults which may hurt the financial sector’s soundness and weaken their lending and overall financial intermediary functions, consequently exacerbating the overall economic basis.Meanwhile, major economies are in the process of preparing or already implementing preemptive measures to support their financial industries by cleaning up non-performing loans and recapitalizing so as to strengthen its intermediary role of supporting the real economic sectors.Notwithstanding Korea’s economy’s relatively strong position, in order to be better prepared for potential risks in case of further deterioration of global market conditions, the government has decided to take preemptive initiatives to strengthen financial institutions’ intermediary functions and to eliminate any potential sources for systemic risks.To do so, early resolution of NPLs in the financial industry has to be preceded to help ascertain its overall soundness. For this, the government already announced its plan to set up a Restructuring Fund under KAMCO in February. On March 13, the government unveils its additional plan to enhance existing regulations to facilitate the government’s rendering greater support to financial institutions in need of further recapitalization. Improved regulations will also allow for launching a government-guaranteed KAMCO bonds in the total amount of KRW 40 trillion. The bills proposing these initiatives will be submitted to the National Assembly in April.Under these new initiatives, financial institutions’ soundness will greatly improve and their ability to shore up real economic sectors will also be strengthened.For the same purpose, the Bank Recapitalization Fund has alre
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Mar 13, 2009

Fitch Ratings' Stress Test

1. Summary of Fitch Ratings’stress test on Korean banksGlobal credit rating agency, Fitch Ratings, announced the results of its stress test on Korean banks on Thursday, March 12th at around 22:00 (Seoul time).A summary of the stress test results is as follows:Under a stress scenario during the period from June 2008 through December 2010, Korean banks would see a decline in capitalization totaling KRW 42 trillion due to credit costs, losses on equity and debt securities holdings and asset growth through the inflation of foreign currency assets given the depreciation of the Korean won in the past year.The banks’ combined equity-to-assets ratio would decline from 6.4 percent in June 2008 to 4.0 percent in December 2010.The KRW 42 trillion reduction in capitalization would require additional capital raisings by the banks, and such capital may have to come from the government. The government’s current KRW 20 trillion Bank Recapitalization Fund may not be sufficient, particularly to the extent it is used to buy subordinated debt and lower quality hybrid debt from the banks.2. Government’s response to the stress test resultsA. The results of the stress test are based on variables and assumptions (e.g. estimated loss rates on bonds and securities), which can be easily altered by future economic events. Therefore, the government finds it inappropriate for Fitch to release such speculative results on Korean banks when this could adversely impact their international credibility and financial soundness.B. Even if the worst possible scenario were to be materialized, in which the expected loss of 42 trillion won were to be taken into account and no new recapitalization were to be assumed, the tangible common equity (TCE) ratio of Korean banks would be 4.0 percent as of the end of 2010, which would be still higher than the current TCE ratios of major leading banks worldwide. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ratio would be 8.7 percent, still higher than th
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Mar 06, 2009

FSC Article Published in AWSJ

By Rhee ChangyoungSEOUL—South Korea, like all other advanced economies, has inevitably been affected by the financial-market turmoil seeping the globe. Yet the precise nature of these effects on our economy has too often been misunderstood. Some commentators claim that Korea is facing another major financial crisis similar to what it experienced during the Asian financial crisis. This is untrue, and it is important to set the record straight.The Korean economy is often inaccurately characterized as weak because of its external debt. It is true that Korea’s total external debt up for repayment within 2009 is $194 billion. But $39 billion of that amount is considered non-obligatory debt, such as foreign-exchange hedging and advanced payment receipts for ship orders that will clear off the books when the ships are delivered. Korea’s net external debt totals $155 billion, or 77% of Korea’s foreign reserves of $201.5 billion as of last month. The current roll-over ratio of foreign debt as of February is over 91%. Inother words, our banks and corporations are experiencing no problems repaying or refinancing their debts. Looking at the banking sector alone, out of total external debt of $171.7 billion as of the end of 2008, debt held by branches of foreign banks accounts for $72.3 billion, which does not affect the solvency of domestic banks. The actual amount of external debt held by domestic banks as of the end of 2008 is $99.4 billion—only half of Korea’s foreign reserves.Nonetheless, some market commentators have openly expressed their pessimism. Perhaps such pessimism might be traced back to Korea’s 1997 crisis and the fear that it may be repeated. Such a possibility, however, is slim. The Korean economy today is very different from what it was a decade ago.First, the corporate sector whose debts helped trigger the Asian financial crisis in Korea has been transformed, and is now sound and transparent. The ratio of corporate debt to equity, for instance,
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Mar 05, 2009

Restructuring of Shipping Companies

1. BackgroundIn recent years, shipping companies have continuously grown in size* driven by drastic rise in freight rates (Baltic Exchange Dry Index (BDI)).Starting from the end of last year, the business environments have gotten drastically worsened with sudden freefall of freight rates. Consequently, many had to curtail their operations and some became insolvent.For instance, Samsun Logics, the 9th biggest in terms of asset size, filed for petition for a rehabilitation program in February.Although the freight rates have gone up a bit lately, up to 2,084 by March 4, due to prevalent oversupply, a recovery in full scale is deemed difficult.As such, there has been some concern about increasing insolvency among shipping companies as it might burden other related industries, especially shipbuilding or financial companies. Furthermore, their insolvency can be easily spread over to the overall shipping industry because of the complex, multi-layered chartering contracts.Most certainly, if the number of chartering contract cancellation continues to increase, then shipbuilding and financial companies will inevitably face the risk. Therefore, the following restructuring plans, which are to be carried out on a day-to-day, ongoing basis, will help contain increasing insolvency in the shipping industry and to revamp the industry so as to strengthen its competitiveness in the global market.2. Restructuring PlansA. Continuous restructuring of shipping companiesIn line with the existing corporate restructuring procedures* supported by the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, creditor banks will conduct credit risk assessment of subject shipping companies on an ongoing basis.*Already, companies whose total loans amount to KRW 50 billion or more are subject to annual mandatory credit risk assessment, due June every year, by their creditor banks.To facilitate the restructuring process, creditor banks will be advised to complete risk assessments by early May this year for shipping c
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Feb 27, 2009

Korean Banking sector

1. Korean banks' borrowing in foreign currenciesKorean banks’ borrowing in foreign currencies as of end-Jan. 2009 totaled at $92.6 billion, out of which $38.3 billion is scheduled to mature within 2009.In addition to the total external borrowing by Korean banks, $67.76 billion, the figure released by the Bank of Korea on February 19 takes into account both foreign banks' loans and domestic loans in foreign currencies.- The debts maturing within this year amounts to $38.3 billion ($64 billion if government aid is included).Foreign bank branches' borrowing in foreign currency stood at $64 billion as of end-Jan, of which an estimated amount of $62.6 billion will mature within 2009.2. External debt (released on Feb. 20) and offshore borrowing in foreign currency (on Feb. 19)The FSC would like to clarify on the difference between current figures of Korean banks' external debts as released on February 20 and borrowings in foreign currencies as released on February 19 by Bank of Korea.**Statistics Released◇ Korean banks' total external debts: $99.39 billion (as of end-Dec. 2008) External debts maturing in 2009: $45.24 billion◇ External borrowing in foreign currencies (excluding Citi and SCFirst): $67.76 billion (as of end-Jan. 2009)⇒ There is $31.63 billion difference between the balance of external debts and that of external borrowing.①Definition of external debt and offshore borrowing in foreign currencyBy definition, external debts refer to debts owed by residents to non-residents; accordingly, the transaction between residents (i.e. between domestic banks) should not be regarded as external debts.- External debts include non-debt liabilities such as deposits and payable spot exchanges.The total sum of offshore borrowing in foreign currencies is calculated based on the amount borrowed that actually becomes a burden on domestic banks in terms of their solvency.- Offshore borrowing indicates banks’ actual funding situation in foreign currency.②Comparing exte
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Feb 27, 2009

Corrections for The Economist Article

The Ministry of Strategy and Finance and the Financial Services Commission issue the following explanations to correct factual errors and questionable assertions made in the article titled "Domino theory" published by 'The Economist' on February 26, 2009. *Please read the attached file for details.
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Feb 25, 2009

Bank Recapitalization Fund Formation and Operation

Amid global economic crisis, banks need to take more aggressive roles in supporting real economic sectors and corporate restructuring in a concerted effort to overcome the financial turmoil without hurting Korea’s economic growth potentials.From this perspective, since the beginning of the second half of last year, the government has been raising the issue of launching the Bank Recapitalization Fund as a way to boost banks’ funding and loss bearing capacities.In its report to the President on the annual work plan, the Financial Services Commission announced its plan to form the Fund so as to enable banks to take upon the leading role in shoring up real economic sectors and the on-going restructuring programs.To maximize the effect of the Fund, the government has encouraged banks to provide their feedback on the plan, and based on the ideas gathered thus far, following detailed plans have been finalized.I. Progress in the formation of the FundIn December 2008, the government announced the plan to set up Bank Recapitalization Fund in the amount of 20 trillion won.On February 15, 2009, banks’ CEOs and the regulators met and ran a joint workshop regarding the plan as to ways of making best use of the Fund in providing liquidity to the real economic sectors and their restructuring. General consensus has been reached that banks will be able access the Fund within their credit limits, and banks are free to decide on how to use the funds.Commercial banks, holding companies as well as Industrial Bank of Korea, NACF, and NFFC can apply for the fund.Some recommended usage:a. In support of real economic sectors: by extending new credit lines or roll-overs to SMEs, funding to credit guarantee schemesb. In support of corporate restructuring programs: new credit extension to or funding for the debt-to-equity swap of companies under workout programs, capital injection to the Corporate Restructuring Fund (KAMCO)c. In support of PFs or NPL write-offsOn February 25, 2009 at the
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Feb 24, 2009

Remodeling Currency Futures Products Market

BackgroundIn response to increasing demand for Currency Futures Products (CFPs) for hedging purpose, especially by corporate international traders, the Financial Services Commission and Korea Exchange (KRX) have decided to push ahead with "remodeling" the currency futures market so as to allow easier access of the instruments in place of riskier OTC derivatives.Currently, CFPs in major currencies--US dollar, Euro and Yen--are traded in large units with rigid trading restrictions, failing to meet the demands in the market which becomes increasingly diversified in terms of units, maturities and contract conditions.Because of rigid CFPs trading restrictions, international traders prefer OTC derivatives for foreign currency hedging as the latter allows more flexibility for the traders and their counterparties in forging contracts.Most OTC derivatives carry high risks especially for traders with insufficient knowledge in such complex products as KIKOs. Further, the OTC derivatives markets have shrunk under high pressures of current crisis.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 19, 2009

Corporate Restructuring Strategic Directions

Amid the global financial crisis, with acute awareness of the importance to revamp the overall economic structures in an effort to prevent spread of financial defaults in the markets, the Korean government has decided to pursue quick and effective restructuring measures.The market environment of current crisis, however, is different from that of the 1997 Asian crisis in that there are no major defaults realized in the market, and this makes it more difficult for the government to push forward with one time, full-fledged corporate restructuring as back then.Also, as the global economy has uniformly entered a drastic downturn, the expected efficacy of corporate restructuring progrmas especially in eliminating market uncertainty appears rather limited.With such understanding, the Korean government has built the consensus for the importance of taking clear stances and establishing firm principles in pursuing corporate restructuring in order to maximize the change of its successful outcome.Accordingly, the officials from relevant ministries worked jointly to draft restructuring strategic directions and key action plans, and they were finalized on February 19, 2009 through the discussions at the Presidential Economic Crisis Management Committee meeting.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 18, 2009

Reverse Mortgage Loan Stimulus Initiatives

BackgroundReverse mortgage loan was first introduced in Korea in July 2007. In the era of aging society with accelerating ratio of senior citizens amid the heightened economic downturn, the need to bolster the utilization of the loan as a way to generate cash income for elder homeowners has been in demand in the market.In response, the Presidential Crisis Management Committee discussed the issue and decided on February 18, 2009 to pursue the stimulus initiatives for the loan.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 16, 2009

FSCMA and Common Concerns

IntroductionSince the inauguration of the new administration, the government has put great emphasis on the importance of the financial industry as a main engine of growth for the nation's economy. To that end, the government is committed to providing all the support necessary with a particular focus on fostering the regulatory environment in which the financial market can thrive with maximum autonomy and momentum. In this way, the government wants to help laying out a solid basis for the local financial market to grow as an advanced market.The Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (FSCMA) was legislated in August 2007 and went into effect on February 4, 2009. The Act's main purpose is to sharpen Korean capital market's competitive edge in the global market. In line with this aim, the Act contains regulatory changes to enable the industry to provide combined products and services to consumers. This can be possible through the expansion of business scopes and implementation of more function-based regulations rather than sector-based ones.As for the expansion of their business operational scopes, financial institutions are to enjoy much flexibility in product development, especially in diversifying financial products and services in line with the global trend toward diversification and securitization. Accordingly, the government's policy also aims to cultivate sophisticated financial environments, suitable for the current climate in the global financial market.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 16, 2009

Joint Workshop Report

Banks' Decision to Roll Over All Corporate Loans Maturing in 2009In response to the recent decision to roll over all existing Kibo and KODIT guarantees maturing for a year in 2009, nine Korean banks have pledged to roll over all existing corporate loans maturing in 2009, regardless of whether the loans are backed by the credit guarantees. The loans to companies that have shut down and bankrupt companies are not included.The expanded payment guarantees and support from the bank recapitalisation fund are expected to allow banks to increase new lending by reducing their burden of maintaining the BIS ratios.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 12, 2009

Emergency Credit Guarantee for SME

BackgroundIn the midst of deepening global financial crisis, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and business owners are facing capital liquidity problems because of tightening market conditions. Domestic financial institutions including banks, wary of escalating credit risks, have been reluctant to grant loans to SMEs and business owners with relatively low credits.Decreasing export and faltering domestic consumption have further deteriorated the business conditions especially for companies that rely on exports and produce price-sensitive goods or services. As such, SME bankruptcies have been on the rise while SME loans have significantly dropped. Therefore, a need for SMEs' easier liquidity access have been urgently called for.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 09, 2009

Moody's Credit Rating Adjustment

On February 9, Moody's credit rating agency adjusted the ratings of foreign currency long-term debts of eight Korean banks to the level of Korea's sovereign credit rating (A2): Hana Bank, IBK, KEXIM, Kookmin Bank, KDB, NACF, Shinhan Bank and Woori Bank. This is a follow-up action on Moody's earlier announcement (January 15) of its plan to review Korean banks' foreign debt ratings.It should be noted that this rating adjustment reflects the change in Moody's method of rating banks' credit rating, and not any deterioration in Korean banks' creditworthiness or in their external funding status, which remain the same.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Feb 05, 2009

Korea Economy Overview

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to welcome all of you and thank you for taking the time to be with us today.My presentation today largely consists of three parts.Firstly, I will give you a brief overview of Korea’s real economy and financial market and move on to talk about newly emerging risk factors in the Korean economy and their effect on the economy.Then, I will close by introducing how the Korean government is responding to the economic challenges.Now, let me start with the current status of the Korean economy and financial market.First of all, let me talk to you about the current status of Korea’s real economy.As some foreign investors are concerned, it is true that Korea’s real economy is fast deteriorating. Domestic demand is slowing down rapidly with 19.8 percent fall in December industrial output from a year earlier as well as 7.0 percent decline in consumer goods sales. Exports in December also fell by 17.9 percent year-on-year (by 29 percent according to the estimation for the period from Jan. 1 to Jan. 20).However, let me emphasize that such economic slowdown is not limited to Korea and is witnessed commonly around the world following the global financial crisis. The Korean economy is doing rather well compared to other Asian countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.If we compare December industrial output, Korea saw 19.8 percent fall while Taiwan and Singapore suffered 32.4 percent and 13.5 percent decline respectively. Even in terms of export, which is one of the main causes of concern, we see that Taiwan and Singapore have recorded greater fall than Korea with 41.9 percent and 20.8 percent decline respectively.Moreover, Korea is maintaining relatively low unemployment rate of 3.3 percent as of last December.However, things are looking better in the financial market. To our relief, the global financial market volatility has eased slightly, improving investor confidence and financial stability in Korea.The Korean stock market has recent
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Jan 28, 2009

Understanding Korean Economy (FAQs)

Q1: How has Korea reacted to the economic difficulties so far?A: The Korean government has worked on expansionary liquidity supply of USD55 billion, tax reduction of USD35 billion, and increased fiscal expenditure of USD16 billion.The Korean government has taken preventive, decisive and sufficient policy measures to get out of the global economic turmoil. The measures mainly cover liquidity supply, FX market stabilization, and tax reduction and expansionary fiscal expenditure. To provide more liquidity in the market and lower interest rates, the Bank of Korea lowered a benchmark interest rate four times by 225bp from 5.25 percent to 3.00 percent. Also, the government has supplied the liquidity of KWR19,500 billion through RP purchases and credit limit raise for small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs).Foreign liquidity supply of USD55 billion will have been provided with USD37.6 billion already provided by the end of Dec. ’08. Currency swap arrangements with the US, Japan, and China, amounting to USD30 billion each, have been completed along with the IMF Short-term Liquidity Facility of USD22 billion fixed. The government guarantee on banks’ borrowing in foreign currencies will total USD100 billion.A total of USD35 billion tax reduction will have been implemented from ’08 to ’12 through an oil tax rebate and income/corporate tax reduction. Additional budgets of USD16 billion will have been allocated from ’08 to ’09, which are earmarked for overcoming economic difficulties including high energy prices.Deregulations to boost corporate investment, various job maintenance efforts such as promoting employment of female, the young and old, and social safety net reinforcement are among other measures the Korean government has taken.Q2: What are the key economic policies for 2009? A: The key economic polices for 2009 can be summarized as preparation for the future and job creation. The Korean government will take offensive measures to revitalize the economy a
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Jan 22, 2009

YOIDO, SEOUL AND MUNHYEON, BUSAN AS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTERS

Summary of the Financial Center Promotion Committee MeetingOn January 21, 2009 the Financial Center Promotion Committee* meeting, chaired by the FSC Chairman, was held and deliberated the designation of international financial center(s). Based on the assessment report on five candidate cities,* prepared by the Evaluation Panel, the Committee members discussed what city or cities to be designated to serve as an international financial center in the region.*Financial Center Promotion Committee was convened on the basis of “Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Creation and Development of Financial Center.” The Committee has 25 members: 10 financial experts, 10 presidents of financial regulatory agencies, and 5 government officials (FSC and Ministry of Strategy and Finance).*Five candidate cities: Seoul (Yoido), Busan (Munhyeon, Bukhang), Incheon (Songdo), Gyeung-gi (Goyang), Jeju (Seoguipo)As a result of careful deliberation, the Committee has reached a consensus to designate Yoido, Seoul as the main Financial Center and Munhyeon, Busan as its specialized financial center. The decision will be submitted to the FSC Committee for its final approval.Detailed plans will be made to develop these two cities as financial centers within a first half of this year through consultation with the related government ministries and regional governments. To facilitate the process, the Financial Center Promotion Committee will form a subcommittee.Major ProgressesIn December 2007 the government enacted legislation called “Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Creation and Development of Financial Center” with an aim to designate and develop a region as an international financial center.* Selection process was set off by operative direction initiatives made in March 2008 and deliberation by the Promotion Committee (convened in June 2008). *According to the “Act on the Creation and Development of Financial Center” a financial center is defined as a region in which both domestic
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Jan 20, 2009

Risk Assessment for Construction and Shipbuilding Companies

1. Background and Direction of Corporate RestructuringKorea’s financial markets have not been immune from the credit freeze and losses accruing to financial institutions stemming from global financial crisis. The crisis has spread to aggravate corporate liquidity and slow down the real economy and swift restructuring is needed to reverse the cycle of financial market uncertainties and shrinking real economy.To facilitate the corporate restructuring process, the FSC/FSS established the Corporate Credit Support Task Force last November 28 and proposed the Corporate Restructuring Plan and Direction that was to be implemented in detail on December 9, 2008.While the focus will be on saving companies, the financial regulatory authorities determined to move quickly towards corporate resolution for those with no realistic prospect of turnaround.Distressed construction and shipbuilding companies––many hit particularly hard by the ongoing economic downturn––have been singled out as the first group in restructuring.Unlike the currency crisis of 1997 when unequivocal corporate insolvencies allowed for broad restructuring on an industry scale, it has been difficult to be preemptive although main creditor banks have participated aggressively this time in quickly reaching their credit risk assessments in order to overcome the economic crisis as soon as possible.2. PromptAction on Credit RiskAssessment ResultsTo turn troubled companies around as soon as possible, those found to have warranted joint administration by creditor financial institutions received a workable level of financial support and close management oversight to pursue self-rescue plans.By working steadfast in concert with their creditors, companies that manage to normalize their operations are expected to get second wind and grow stronger as a sound company in the future.There is the possibility that the joint administration by creditor financial institutions will adversely affect, among others, the compan
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Jan 12, 2009

IFSB-FSC/FSS to Host Seminar on Islamic Finance in Seoul

The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Financial Services Commission/Financial Supervisory Service will jointly host the Seminar on Islamic Finance in Seoul from January 13 to 14, 2009, at the Sogong-dong Lotte Hotel. The FSC/FSS joined the IFSB as an Observer member onAugust 8, 2008, and through this seminar hope to develop a growing interest in Islamic finance.Five separate sessions, which include presentations and discussions, are scheduled during the two-day seminar. Among the topics to be discussed are potential legal and organizational issues for non-Islamic countries attempting to implement Islamic financial systems and their solutions, how to use Shari’ah in cooperation with the current regulatory system, recent developments in the Islamic bond market and issues related to credit rating, and challenges and opportunities for Korea.Approximately 300 participants from home and abroad, including 17 speakers, 14 from abroad, together with participants representing the government, financial institutions, and academic institutions, are expected to attend the seminar. Dr. Jun Kwang-Woo, Chairman of the FSC, will deliver the opening remarks of President Lee Myuang-Bak.The Seminar on Islamic Finance will provide an opportunity to participants to gain comprehensive and practical knowledge of Islamic finance while also offering the chance to network with Islamic finance regulators and financial experts.The IFSB is an international standard-setting organization that promotes and enhances the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry. Founded in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on November, 2002, the IFSB, as of December, 2008, has 178 members from 34 countries.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Jan 09, 2009

Review of Financial Assistance to SMEs

I. Review of Financial Assistance to SMEs in 20081. Banks Loans to SMEs(2008) Outstanding amount of loans to SMEs by 18 domestic banks increased by KRW 52.4trl. (from KRW 370trl in 2007 to KRW 422.2trl in 2008)(December 2008) With the year-end effect, the amount of SMEs loans decreased by KRW 1.8trl. However, when including special set-off between loans and deposits carried out to support SMEs (KRW 0.7trl), amortization and sell-off of bad debts (KRW 0.9trl), the actual amount of SME loans was decreased only by KRW 70.9bn.* With the year-end effect (settlement of financial statements at the end of the year, settlement of B2B transaction, etc.), SMEs loans tends to decrease usually in December.When comparing the average decrease amount of SME loans in December for the past 5 years (KRW -2.8trl) with the decreased amount in December last year (KRW -3.6trl), it is not so noticeable.2. Fast-Track (Special Assistance Program to Tackle Liquidity Problems of SMEs)KRW 2.8trl was provided to 1,672 companies through the Fast Track Program from October 13 to December 31, 2008.KRW 1.4trl was provided to 413 companies which experienced loss from currency option such as KIKO.Assistance through the Fast Track Program has been accelerated since last December; the number of assisted enterprises increased by 2.5 times.3. Issuance of P-CBOKRW 1trl of P-CBO was issued in 2008 to help solve financial difficulties of SMEs which could not issue corporate bond due to their poor credit rating.Corporate Bond Market Stabilization Fund underwrote the 3rd issuance, which benefited joined enterprises with lower issuing rate (from 8.4% to 6.6%) and lower additional rate. (from 50bp to 5bp)4. Consultation on SMEs' Financial DifficultiesSince the opening of the ｢Consultation Center for Financial Difficulties of SMEs｣, the accumulated number of consultation cases reached 1,060. (including the consultation carried in related organization of banks)Banks admitted 526 cases (49.6%) and provided KRW
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