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Aug 02, 2010
- Plans to Enhance the Short-term Financing Market
- Current Status-quo of the Short-term Financing MarketBy short-term financing, we mean wholesale financing among financial institutions by trading or issuing under 1- year maturity products such as Calls, RPs, CPs, and CDs.An analysis of current situation by individual market sectors① (Call Market) Daily average volume of KRW 33 trillion*, which takes up about 50% of the short term financing market.* Reduced down to KRW 11 trillion level, but recently resumed to the pre-crisis level.(’08.9: KRW 29 trillion, ’09.3: KRW 11.5 trillion, ’09.12: KRW 30.2 trillion, ’10.6: KRW 33.1 trillion)② (RP) Trading volume (outstanding balance base) has been consistently growing.(’07: KRW 65 trillion, ’08: KRW 69 trillion, ’09: KRW 72 trillion). Most of the transactions (87%) are large client based.③ (CD) Dropped to KRW 79 trillion level due to the curb on Loan-to-Deposit Ratio regulation, while market trading volume has gone down to KRW 4.5 trillion daily average.Source: Bank of KoreaProblems Detected in the Short-Term Financing MarketThe overriding problem in the short-term financing market is that it is too much concentrated on the Call market which causes distortions to the market function and may entail latent systemic risk.- The convenience of Call transactions using credit based lending with high liquidity and low interest rate triggered the growing dependency of the Call market by financial institutions.- Composition of the short term financing market (as of May ’10): Call (50.5%), RP (16%), CP (17.2%), CD (16.4%) - The Call market’s function has been misled as ‘funding sources’ for the secondary financial institutions’ (e.g. securities houses and mutual savings banks) operating capital and in turn used to invest in high yielding short term KTBs.- In particular, excessive ‘call money’ by securities houses could become a source of potential systemic risk when hit by a sudden credit crunch.- The over-usage of the Call market also led to the unde
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Jul 30, 2010
- Privatization Plan for Woori Financial Group
- The Public Funds Oversight Committee has held the 22nd Meeting today to finalize its plans to sell the remaining shares of Woori Financial Group (WFG) held by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), where a consensus has been reached that after successfully making two block sales, once in November 2009 and once in April 2010, totaling 16% of WFG, bringing the total amount of shares held by the KDIC down to a 50% level, an appropriate condition has been set to finalize the privatization of WFG.The privatization will be carried out with the three basic principles: maximizing recovery of injected public funds; making an early privatization; and contributing to sound and productive advancement of the financial industry.(1) Method of privatizationIn line with the three basic principles, the sale of WFG shares will be done through two steps of open competitive bidding process by domestic and foreign investors; first, by preliminary bidding; and second, by final bidding.(2) Simultaneous sale of WFG and regional banksBoth the shares of WFG and the shares of regional banks held by WFG (Kyungnam Bank and Kwangju Bank) will be sold separately but up for the bidding at the same time.Although the two regional banks are under WFG, it has been viewed as more effective to sell them separately due to them not having an integrated data processing network with WFG and with low level of synergy effect. Moreover, because their value would be greater when sold separately taking into account their regional focused businesses.However, the bidding will be carried out simultaneously to prevent any delay in the overall privatization process.The sale of regional banks will be for 50% plus ne share or done through a completemerger. And the actual amount of shares of WFG to be sold or whether it will be done through a merger will be determined and finalized with close discussions with the to-be- selected sales advisory firms. (3) Selection of sales advisory firmsConsidering the size and
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Jul 28, 2010
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Jul 27, 2010
- Stimulation Plan for Long-term KTB Futures Trade
- The Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Financial Services Commission and Korea Exchange (“KRX”) have jointly prepared the plan to stimulate trading of long-term Korea Treasury Bond (“KTB”) Futures.Recently, an opportunity to promote the trading of long-term KTBs has been presented as a result of growing issuance amount and trading volume of long-term KTBs. As the need to stimulate the 10-year KTB Futures trading volume grew, the task force made of representatives of research community, public sector and private sector was created in January 2010 to prepare the plan for promotion of long-term KTB Futures trade.The causes for poor trading of long-term KTB Futures may be examined in terms of cash market, market making and trading regulations.First, although the annual issuance amount of short-term and long-term KTBs is balanced , the trading condition in the secondary market is dominated by the short-term KTBs. For example, as of the end of June 2010, the outstanding amount of KTBs with maturity longer than 10-year is 46% of total outstanding amount of KTBs, but the trading volume of KTBs with maturity longer than 10-year is mere 13% of total trading volume of KTBs.Second, the market making for 10-year KTB Futures is rather inadequate and the primary dealers (“the PDs”) who account for over 53% of trading volume of 10-year KTBs do not actively participate in trading or market making of 10-year KTB Futures.Last, the physical delivery, which is the method used for final settlement of 10-year KTB Futures, acts as constraint in trading long-term KTB Futures. The investors are not familiar with the physical delivery settlement and as trading of long-term KTBs in the cash market is not brisk, the investors felt burdened in securing the deliverable KTBs for the final settlement by physical delivery.As the favorable condition has been created to stimulate the trading of long-term KTB Futures, it is expected that trading of long-term KTBs in the cash market would thr
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Jul 21, 2010
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Jul 20, 2010
- "Sunshine Loans" for Low-Income Households
- 1. BackgroundIn the wake of global financial crisis, low-income households have become more in need of loans; however, loans for them have become less available as financial institutions for low- income households have been more concentrated on equity investment and project financing. As a result, low-income households have been increasingly relying on private lenders and credit business providers, thus facing the burden of paying higher interests.Moreover, as the Bank of Korea (BOK) recently raised the base interest rate, if it leads to arise in market interest rates, low-income household would bear higher burden of inter st payment.(1) Starting from the end of July, approximately KRW 10 trillion will be extended over the next five years through the “Sunshine Loan” program by financial institutions* for low- income households.*The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, the National Credit Union Federation of Korea, the Korean Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives, and mutual savings banks(2) The loans will be extended to individuals whose credit rating ranges from level 6 to level 10 or small business owners whose annual income is less than KRW 20 million.(3) Interest rates will be set by each financial institution but with a ceiling* in place.*As of July 20, the interest rate ceiling is 10.6% for financial cooperatives, 13.1 % for mutual savings banks. The ceiling may be adjusted depending on changes in funding costs of one-year maturity term deposits.(4) The Sunshine loan program aims to help low-income households start up business (up to KRW 50 million), provide operating capital for business (up to KRW 20 million), or support urgently needed living expenses (up to KRW 10 million).(5) Assuming that each individual makes a KRW 10 million loan, one million people are expected to benefit from the Sunshine loan program over the next five years. The Sunshine loan program will reduce the low-income ho
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Jul 01, 2010
- Amendments to the Insurance Business Act
- Amendments to the Insurance Business Act were passed at the National Assembly June 29, 2010 to strengthen insurance consumer protection.1. Strengthening insurance consumer protection(1) Insurers are subject to a stricter obligation to inform consumers of their insurance products. Selling their insurance policies, insurers have to provide prior information on their policies such as contract terms and conditions in which benefit payments are denied and receive consumers’ written consent. In violation of the obligation, an insurance company has to pay a fine of up to 20% of premium payments, or sales representatives and sales agencies are subject to a 20 million won or less fine.(2) The amended Act adopted a suitability or “Know-Your-Client” principle. Under the principle, insurers have to be well informed of consumers’ income, wealth, and investment purpose and recommend appropriate products that meet consumers’ needs. The principle will be applied first to universal insurance products.(3) In order to protect consumers from false or exaggerated advertisements, the amended Act specifies what should be included or not when advertising insurance products. Advertisements should include prior notices that recommend consumers to read brochures, contract terms and conditions, warning against possible loss of the principal. By omitting or providing insufficient information, advertisements should not mislead consumers to believe that benefit payments are fully guaranteed without any condition. Consumers should be well informed of the maximum amount of benefits, conditions to deny benefit payments, and immunity clauses.(4) For insurance contracts specified in the Presidential Decree (e.g. medical reimbursement insurance), it is an insurer’s obligation to confirm whether a consumer already has the insurance.(5) Insurers have to specify in their brochures conditions in which benefit payments are denied.(6) Policy holders are allowed to confirm, withdraw, and cancel* t
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Jun 25, 2010
- 2010 Credit Risk Evaluations on Large Companies
- Evaluation ResultsCreditor banks announced today a total of 65 companies for restructuring after completing their credit risk evaluations on 1,985 companies with outstanding credit lines of more than KRW50.0 billion.Of the 65 companies, 16 were constructors with 9 rated C and 7 rated D; 3 shipbuilders with 1 rated C and 2 rated D; 1 shipping company rated C; and the remaining 45 large companies of which 27 were rated C and 18 rated D.Mainly as a result of the downturn in the construction industry, 16 companies were tapped for restructuring while the number of shipbuilding and shipping companies selected for restructuring fell from 17 last year.The Korean government is giving full consideration to help the restructuring process move forward as fast and effectively as possible while minimizing the weight of restructuring on the companies’ subcontractors.Impact on Financial Company SoundnessThe debt obligations of the 65 companies tapped for restructuring in this latest evaluation was KRW16.7 trillion, including KRW6.8 trillion in constructors PF contingent liabilities. Of the total, KRW11.9 trillion was due to banks, KRW1.5 trillion to savings banks, and KRW700 billion to credit specialized financial companies.Additional reserves for bad debts that financial institutions are expected to set aside for this round of restructuring is around KRW3.0 trillion, but its impact on financial companies’ soundness should be limited given banks’ strong financial position to absorb losses. As of end-March 2010, domestic banks’ BIS ratio was 14.7%, up from 12.31% as of end-2008 and 14.36% as of end-2009.Currently banks’ had KRW2.2 trillion in reserves set aside for bad debts while savings banks had KRW200 billion and other financial institutions KRW600 billion.*Please read the attached file for details.
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Jun 24, 2010
- Amendments to the Enforcement Decree of the Mutual Savings Banks
- As the Amendments to the Enforcement Decree of the Mutual Savings Banks Act have passed the Cabinet Meeting in June 22, they are expected to be enforced starting from July 2010.A major change is that banks’ equity capital will be calculated based on the BIS definition, and not on the balance sheet definition as previously done.Standards for calculation of a bank’s equity capitalPreviously, a bank’s equity capital was defined as total assets minus total liabilities on the balance sheet. Under the amended enforcement decree, mutual banks are required to follow the BIS definition of equity capital, which consists of Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, and deductible items. Each has to meet the following qualifications:(1) Tier 1 capital: a bank’s core net assets with permanent features (e.g. paid-in-capital, capital surplus)(2) Tier 2 capital: capital equivalent to Tier 1, capable of covering loss(e.g. subordinated bonds, subordinated deposits, cumulative preferred stock)(3) Deductible items: Items that do not actually contribute to the soundness of capital should be excluded from equity capital. (e.g. treasury stock)(4) A bank’s equity capital ratio is to be calculated every six months. In two months after the calculation, the new ratio will be applied for six months.*Details on Tier 1, Tier 2 and deductible items will be specified in supervision regulations.Implementation scheduleThe amended enforcement decree mandates the Supervision Regulations of the Mutual Savings Banks and the Supervision Rules of the Mutual Savings Banks to stipulate details.The amendments are expected to be implemented starting July 1.*Please read the attached file for details.
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Jun 16, 2010
- Conference on "The Global Financial Crisis and Microfinance: Challenges and International Cooperation"
- The Financial Services Commission (FSC), the World Bank and the Korea DevelopmentInstitute (KDI) co-hosted an international conference on “the Global Financial Crisis andMicrocredit: Challenges and International Cooperation” on June 15.As the first-ever conference on microfinance jointly hosted by the Korean government and aninternational organization, it was attended by Kwon Hyuk-Se, the Vice Chairman of the FSC,Kim Seung-Yoo, the Chairman of the Smile Microcredit Bank, Tunc Uyanik, the SectorManger of the World Bank, and many distinguished guests. Participants had in-depthdiscussions on the impact of the global financial crisis on microfinance, each country’sresponse to the financial crisis, and initiatives to strengthen international cooperation. FSC’s Vice Chairman Kwon pointed out that the global financial crisis increased the numberof the poor and widened the gap between the rich and the poor, which could lead to a social conflict. Against this backdrop, he emphasized that microfinance serves as a social safety net for those who have no access to conventional financial services and an important means for overcoming the global financial crisis. Smile Microcredit project, the Korean model of microfinance, is led by the private sector withprivate donations and dormant savings as funding sources. In the wake of the global financialcrisis, fiscal conditions of many governments have been deteriorated. Vice Chairman Kwonsaid that under such circumstances, microfinance could be a viable option for each government to tackle economic polarization.The Korean government expects the conference to contribute to expanding microfinancebusinesses such as Smile Microcredit. Korea will bring the issue to the G20 summit meetingto urge that microfinance could play a key role in overcoming financial crises. 1. Diversify funding sources, including individuals’ contributions2. Cut operation costs by renting offices from public institutions as Smile Microcredit Bank’s bran
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Jun 14, 2010
- 2ND Round of Strengthened Regualtion on Financial Institutions' FX Soundness
- BackgroundSince the government implemented the new rules to strengthen regulations on financial institutions’ FX soundness in January 2010, FX liquidity ratio has risen, the management of FX derivatives trade has been strengthened, and the overall FX soundness of banks has improved. However, the regulation to limit banks’ FX liquidity ratio has been applied to only domestic banks, not to local branches of foreign banks; therefore, foreign banks are still exposed to risks of mismatch between long-term assets in the Korean won and short-term borrowings in foreign currency.**Please read the attached file for details.Plans1. Regulations on domestic banks will be tightened to raise FX liquidity ratio and Mid-to 1. Regulations on domestic banks will be tightened to raise FX liquidity ratio and Mid-to FX liquidity ratio internally on a daily basis and report to financial authorities on a monthly basis. Securities held to maturity in foreign currency as well as foreign currency borrowings will be included when calculating the ratio of mid-to long-term financing in foreign loan portfolios. The ratio will be raised from 90% to 100%.2. The government will provide guidelines for local branches of foreign banks so that they can manage FX liquidity risk on a voluntary basis. Under the new guidelines, they will be advised to voluntarily manage their FX liquidity risks and acquire safer and longer term FX funding sources. However, some of the standards will be waived if their head office submits a letter of commitment to provide FX liquidity for its branch in Korea at times if needed. Implementing the new guidelines for local branches of foreign banks, a three-month grace period will be given to smooth out the transition. In managing FX liquidity risk, they will be subject to basically similar rules applied to domestic banks such as currency-specific liquidity risk management, diversification of funding source, and contingency funding plans. The guidelines will reflect opinions
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Jun 04, 2010
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Jun 03, 2010
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May 19, 2010
- FSC Chairman's Speech - Korea Economic Forum
- Ⅰ. GreetingsGood morning, ladies and gentlemen!I would like to begin with my thanks to Mr. Song Philho, CEO of JoongAng Ilbo, Mr. Lho Cholsoo, publisher of JoongAng Daily, and Mr. Chung Ki-young, president of Samsung Economic Research Institute, for inviting me to speak at today’s forum.I also wish to acknowledge and thank honorable ambassadors, business leaders, and members of the foreign press who are with us today.The global financial crisis, unprecedented in both scale and scope, now appears to have run its course.Troubling new developments in the euro-zone economies, however, remind us that there are still many post-crisis uncertainties we must contend with.So, once again, we must wonder where the euro-zone crisis is headed, and what impact, if any, it may have on Korea’s financial markets and the economy.And it is my hope that today’s forum will shed new light on some of the questions that are on everyone’s mind.This morning, I would like to use my time to outline major financial policy issues we confront and tasks that lie ahead.Ⅱ. Korea’s Financial Policy: Current Issues TasksThere is no question that the global financial crisis forced us to reflect on our past and take stock of what went wrong.The crisis was, in many ways, a heavy blow to our conventional wisdom: namely, a blind faith in market efficiency, innovation and risk-taking.Now, with the benefit of hindsight, the international community is working to introduce wide-ranging financial regulatory reform measures.I believe we must prepare wisely for what lies ahead and maintain our vigilance on changes that are unfolding in the global financial environment.For our part, we are going to formulate financial policies within the context of the new global financial order with a focus on enhancing Korea’s financial capabilities.Addressing Destabilizing FactorsFirst and foremost, we will continue to respond swiftly and preemptively to destabilizing market developments to put out the fire befor
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May 10, 2010
- Contingency Plans for Southern Europe's Financial Crisis
- Despite the EU-IMF rescue package* for Greece, financial markets faltered amid fears that southern European counties’ debt crisis could spread. Stock markets in the U.S. and Europe fell, and the KOSPI Index on May 6 fell 2% as well. The values of the US dollar and the yen against the Korean won surged. The US dollar against the Korean won on May 6 rose by KRW 25.8, and the yield of 3-year government bonds went up by 0.08%p.However, southern Europe’s debt crisis is expected to have only a limited impact on the Korean financial market because the domestic financial institutions’ exposure to the region is insignificant. As of end-2009, Korean financial companies’ exposure to southern European countries – Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal – is USD 640 million, just 1.2% of the USD 52.8 billion total external exposure. The total borrowings of Korean banks from those countries are only USD 390 million.As market concerns over southern Europe’s debt crisis and its contagion to Europe as a whole might persist for a while, the FSC plans to strengthen its monitoring on financial markets and European capital flows. To this end, the FSC and the FSS will closely monitor capital inflows and outflows and thoroughly examine domestic banks’ foreign liquidity soundness and external borrowing conditions.The FSC will utilize hot-lines and other communications channels with domestic banks to promptly detect and preemptively address market problems. We will also examine and complement individual banks’ contingency plans to raise their capital.Furthermore, in order to ease concerns in financial markets, the FSC will closely work together with the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Bank of Korea (BOK).At a global level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is expected to closely monitor the future developments of the Greek rescue package and promote global coordination through sharing information on each country’s fiscal and economic conditions.*Please refer
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Apr 20, 2010
- Impacts of the Goldman Sachs Case on Financial Markets
- 1. Impacts on domestic and overseas financial marketsIn the wake of the civil action by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Goldman Sachs on April 16, stock markets in the U.S. and Europe fell, and prices of the U.S. Treasury bonds and dollars rose.Domestic markets were also affected by the Goldman Sachs case to a limited extent. The KOSPI dropped by 30bps.Foreign investors sold in the market, and the U.S dollar against the Korean won rose.As of end-2009, domestic financial institutions hold the outstanding securities of USD 350 million issued by Goldman Sachs. That accounts for only 1.8% of foreign securities held by domestic financial institutions (USD 19.04 billion) and does not include a synthetic CDO related to the case.2. ImplicationsThe Goldman Sachs case is expected to bring only a limited impact on Korean financial markets considering the fact that Korean financial institutions hold no CDO at issue and only a small amount of other securities issued by Goldman Sachs. Also, under Korea’s Asset-Backed Securitization Act, it is virtually impossible for special purpose companies (SPCs) to issue synthetic CDOs, similar to the controversial product in question; therefore, it is unlikely that domestic financial institutions wouldexpose investors to similar risks.3. Policy responsesThe FSC will closely monitor any possibility that similar lawsuits would be filed worldwide and domestic financial companies might be involved. At the same time, the FSC will continue to improve investor protection systems such as prior reviews* for OTC derivatives. Currently, amendments to the FSCMA enforcement decree are underway to enforce the prior review system for OTC derivatives in June 2010, and the Korea Financial Investment Association(KOFIA) is formulating rules of prior reviews.*Prior reviews of OTC derivatives, introduced by the amended FSCMA in March 2010, are conducted by a review committee of the KOFIA. Products subject to a prior review include OTC
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Apr 15, 2010
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Apr 07, 2010
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Mar 31, 2010
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Mar 26, 2010
- Regulation on Banks' Loan-to-Deposit Ratios
- In the 2010 Financial Policy Agenda announced in December 2009, the FSC unveiled its plans to adopt banks’ loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio as one of its bank liquidity guidance ratios, which aims to encourage sound management of banks and alleviating factors driving the asset competition among banks. As a step to follow up with the announcement, the Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business is slated to be amended to employ banks’ liquidity or LTD ratio to measure bank management soundness after a notice and adjustment period between March 26 and April 15.BackgroundFor the past few years, expansion in mortgages and SME loans triggered off an asset competition among banks. As a result, signs of instability in banks’ liquidity became apparent during the 2008 financial crisis as bank debentures and other market-based capital served as funding sources while resources that are required to support stepped up lending were not backstopped with deposits.Although domestic banks’ LTD ratio was around 100% at the end of 2004, the ratio had risen sharply between 2005 and 2007 reaching 127.1% at the end of 2007. However, following the persistent guidance from the regulator to reduce the ratio since the second half of 2008, banks’ LTD ratio had fallen to 110.4% as of end-January 2010.Proposed ChangesThe planned changes in the regulation will apply to commercial banks in principle having won-denominated loans in excess of KRW2.0 trillion. This will include foreign bank branches, of which only HSBC will apply with KRW3.3 trillion in won-denominated loans as of December 2009, and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), the only one among the special purpose banks given the policy-driven nature of their loans.The ratio is calculated through the following method, excluding CDs: Loan-to-deposit ratio = won-denominated loans won/denominated deposits* * Demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits (figures from bank balance sheets)The target for banks’ LTD
