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Apr 30, 2009
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Apr 08, 2009
- Pre-Workout Program
- The Credit Counseling and Recovery Service (CCRS) is a nonprofit corporation aiming to support debtors in financial difficulties and regulated by the Financial Services Commission.Starting on April 13 for a limited duration of one year, the CCRS and creditor institutions will run a “Pre-Workout Program” in support of individual borrowers who are delinquent for a short term between one and three months. This plan was first announced in March 10 this year.The main objective of this initiative is to take preemptive steps against further increase in as well as protraction of household delinquents, posing a threat to hurt asset soundness of creditor financial institutions.To be qualified for the program, there are six criteria which applicants must satisfy, and they include the total debt amount limit by two creditors (under KRW 500 million), delinquency length (between 30 and 90 days), and the ratio of new credit to total existing debts (30% maximum), among others.Meanwhile, to prevent credit delinquents from taking advantage of this program by intentionally putting off repayments, the CCRS and financial institutions will soon unveil additional provisions.For further details, interested users can call (1600-5500) or email CCRC (www.ccrs.or.kr) directly.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Mar 06, 2009
- FSC Article Published in AWSJ
- By Rhee ChangyoungSEOUL—South Korea, like all other advanced economies, has inevitably been affected by the financial-market turmoil seeping the globe. Yet the precise nature of these effects on our economy has too often been misunderstood. Some commentators claim that Korea is facing another major financial crisis similar to what it experienced during the Asian financial crisis. This is untrue, and it is important to set the record straight.The Korean economy is often inaccurately characterized as weak because of its external debt. It is true that Korea’s total external debt up for repayment within 2009 is $194 billion. But $39 billion of that amount is considered non-obligatory debt, such as foreign-exchange hedging and advanced payment receipts for ship orders that will clear off the books when the ships are delivered. Korea’s net external debt totals $155 billion, or 77% of Korea’s foreign reserves of $201.5 billion as of last month. The current roll-over ratio of foreign debt as of February is over 91%. Inother words, our banks and corporations are experiencing no problems repaying or refinancing their debts. Looking at the banking sector alone, out of total external debt of $171.7 billion as of the end of 2008, debt held by branches of foreign banks accounts for $72.3 billion, which does not affect the solvency of domestic banks. The actual amount of external debt held by domestic banks as of the end of 2008 is $99.4 billion—only half of Korea’s foreign reserves.Nonetheless, some market commentators have openly expressed their pessimism. Perhaps such pessimism might be traced back to Korea’s 1997 crisis and the fear that it may be repeated. Such a possibility, however, is slim. The Korean economy today is very different from what it was a decade ago.First, the corporate sector whose debts helped trigger the Asian financial crisis in Korea has been transformed, and is now sound and transparent. The ratio of corporate debt to equity, for instance,
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Jan 28, 2009
- Understanding Korean Economy (FAQs)
- Q1: How has Korea reacted to the economic difficulties so far?A: The Korean government has worked on expansionary liquidity supply of USD55 billion, tax reduction of USD35 billion, and increased fiscal expenditure of USD16 billion.The Korean government has taken preventive, decisive and sufficient policy measures to get out of the global economic turmoil. The measures mainly cover liquidity supply, FX market stabilization, and tax reduction and expansionary fiscal expenditure. To provide more liquidity in the market and lower interest rates, the Bank of Korea lowered a benchmark interest rate four times by 225bp from 5.25 percent to 3.00 percent. Also, the government has supplied the liquidity of KWR19,500 billion through RP purchases and credit limit raise for small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs).Foreign liquidity supply of USD55 billion will have been provided with USD37.6 billion already provided by the end of Dec. ’08. Currency swap arrangements with the US, Japan, and China, amounting to USD30 billion each, have been completed along with the IMF Short-term Liquidity Facility of USD22 billion fixed. The government guarantee on banks’ borrowing in foreign currencies will total USD100 billion.A total of USD35 billion tax reduction will have been implemented from ’08 to ’12 through an oil tax rebate and income/corporate tax reduction. Additional budgets of USD16 billion will have been allocated from ’08 to ’09, which are earmarked for overcoming economic difficulties including high energy prices.Deregulations to boost corporate investment, various job maintenance efforts such as promoting employment of female, the young and old, and social safety net reinforcement are among other measures the Korean government has taken.Q2: What are the key economic policies for 2009? A: The key economic polices for 2009 can be summarized as preparation for the future and job creation. The Korean government will take offensive measures to revitalize the economy a
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Jan 20, 2009
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Dec 30, 2008
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Dec 09, 2008
- Direction and Process of Corporate Restructuring
- BackgroundKorea’s financial markets have not been immune from the uncertainties prevailing in the global financial markets as the credit freeze and financial institutions loses continue to grow amid concerns that it would further deteriorate corporate liquidity and slowdown the real economy.A process that clearly sets out how the restructuring will be carried out and who it will affect would address the anxiety and uncertainty plaguing the markets through prompt and orderly restructuring.Restructuring DirectionCorporate restructuring will have a focus on saving companies, even though resolution would follow quickly for those companies deemed to be non-viable. Although industry-wide restructuring is not being ruled out, unlike the financial crisis in the late 1990s the current restructuring will center on individual companies and large business groups. Restructuring will commence alongside financial support for companies that are currently on the Fast Track or workout programs as a result of the temporary squeeze in liquidity.Restructuring ProcessCorporate restructuring will proceed under the discretion of the creditor financial institutions, but the Corporate Credit Support Task Force, the Council of Creditor Financial Institutions, and the Creditor Financial Institutions Steering Committee will also bear a part of the responsibilities along with the government.To lend support and add efficiency to the restructuring process, the FSC/FSS launched the Corporate Credit Support Task Force on November 28, 2008 and is now headed by the governor of the FSS.The Council of Creditor Financial Institutions is comprised of each respective company’s major creditor bank and others, which will discuss and decide restructuring process upon convening Council meetings. The creditor banks will categorize companies into four groups with A being normal, B temporary liquidity shortage, C distressed, and D in receivership. The major creditor banks will work through the Council of Cred
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Nov 25, 2008
- The Global Financial Crisis & Korea’s Policy Response
- IGE/IMF International Conference Luncheon RemarksThe Global Financial Crisis Korea’s Policy ResponseDr. Jun Kwang-Woo Chairman Financial Services CommissionGREETINGSDistinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen,I am delighted to be with you this afternoon, and I thank IGE Chairman Kim Pyung-Joo and President Lee Young-Tak and Dr. Mahmood Pradhan from the IMF for organizing today’s conference and inviting me to speak. I also thank speakers and distinguished participants who are with us today.In light of the deepening distress in the global financial markets, today’s conference, entitled “Lessons from the Recent Global Financial Crisis: Its Implications for the World and Korea,” is both timely and of great interest to every one of us.So I am glad to join you and share with you my perspectives on how the financial crisis emerged, what lessons we can draw from it, and where we go from here. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS KOREAN ECONOMYThe global financial crisis started with collapsing asset prices followed by a debilitating credit crunch. Expansive monetary policy by the U.S. Federal Reserve since 2001 and a surge in foreign capital inflow since 2004 kept interest rates at record low levels.Financial deregulation also swept across the major developed countries beginning in the 1980s. During this time, capital market liberalization also picked up the pace among the emerging countries.This process ultimately led to sharp increases in financial institutions’ leveraged activities and asset inflation. In particular, as financial institutions increasingly employed aggressive asset securitization and complex derivatives to sustain high profit growth, a host of new risks began to weigh on the financial system. For their part, regulators did not fully grasp the situation and preempt the risks. And the global nature of the financial system meant that the systemic risks would be felt and shared by markets around the world.Domestic financial marketsWe are now getting clear i
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Nov 24, 2008
- Statement by the FSC on the BOK's Liquidity Support
- The FSC highly commends the Bank of Korea’s recent preemptive decision to provide liquidity support to companies investing in the Bond Market Stabilization Fund (BMSF). It is intended not only to stabilize the financial market in general, but also to help implement the BMSF in particular, through close cooperation with the government. It is thought that the decision will ease financial companies’ efforts in raising funds for their investments along with any worries of establishing liquidity in the bond market. Thus, the government plans to speedup the process of building the BMSF. Through careful discussions between financial companies, a decision will be made on the participating institutions, the total investment amount, and the specific amount shared by each institution. The BMSF will be set in motion very shortly. The participating institutions will mainly be composed of banks, insurance companies, and securities companies.As already announced, the primary purpose of the Fund is to provide liquidity to quality corporations that are experiencing temporary liquidity shortages due to the current market credit crunch. P-CBOs that have been credit-enhanced by KODIT and KIBO, high-rate ABCPs based on Project Financing, credit financing bonds, and corporate bonds will be the first to be considered on the purchasing list. The issuers will be requested to make their own restructuring efforts when necessary. The details of fund composite, the managing institution, and the priority of trade will be shortly decided after discussions between the participating parties. The Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) will oversee operations from the beginning to ensure investor protection and market stability. Mr. Jun Kwang-Woo, the FSC chairman, has requested that the vice-chairman start meeting with related financial associations and the FSS as of Nov. 25th to discuss detailed plans to propel the project as soon as possible.*Please re
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Nov 14, 2008
- Reporters' Discussion Points with Chairman of the Financial Services Commission
- 1. Recent Market Conditions International Markets- The global markets seem to be stabilizing after the announcement of the U.S. government’s bailout plan and the currency swap agreements signed between the key nations around the world.- Some uncertain elements still exist in the market which are expected to remain until the first quarter of 2009.- With regards to hedge funds managed by major institutional investors, there are likely to be adjustments made to the portfolios early next year which are likely to lead to swift changes in sovereign credit ratings around the globe.Domestic Markets- In response to the crisis, the Korean government utilizing all its resources and departments including the Bank of Korea (BOK), and the regulatory bodies has made devoted efforts to stabilize the domestic financial market.- To provide foreign currency liquidity to financial institutions, - We have carried out a list of actions; guaranteeing external debt payments by local banks; providing foreign currency liquidity using the Swap market; and supporting export financing through the EXIM Bank.- With respect to providing liquidity of domestic currency,- The BOK has acted aggressively by lowering the interest rate 3 times since October 9th, totaling 125bp, and expanding the number of RP receivers.- These efforts have cleared an opening in the flow of funds and has dissolved the liquidity freeze.- However, we are in a phase of a frictional credit freeze because of the lack of liquidity still in local funds.- As a result of the economic slowdown, worries of insolvency in weak segments of the economy are increasing market uncertainty.- Thus, the propensity of investors to be risk adverse is freezing the liquidity of corporate bonds and ABCP.⇒ To summarize the current situation and to put it figuratively, a blood transfusion is given to an anemic patient, but due to the hardening of the arteries, the blood is being prevented from spreading throughout the body.2. Direction of Counter
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Nov 03, 2008
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Oct 30, 2008
- A Decision to Reinforce the Elimination of Malignant Rumors in the Stock Market
- In early September, the Financial Services Commission partnered with other stock market related government agencies to form a Joint Countermeasure Task Force to tackle the recent widespread circulation of malignant rumors regarding the Korean stock market. An unspecified number of rumors have caused an increase in the Korea Exchange to request public inquiries of corporations to verify the nature of the rumors. Moreover, the rumors have been thought not only to disturb the fair trading environment but also to have been the sources for the plunge in certain stocks. There is also suspicion that reports containing negative outlooks from foreign analysts are connected to the initiation of short-selling and market correction. Many of these rumors have been found to be without grounds, thus causing greater concern and sparking the urgency for the development of countermeasures to seek and prevent the sources of the rumors.Implementation Plan1. Joint Countermeasure Task Force● The Expansion of the Countermeasure TeamThe Countermeasure Team which was previously run solely by the FinancialSupervisory Service (FSS) has been expanded and renamed as the JointCountermeasure Task Force to include the cooperation of the Korea SecuritiesDealers Association (KSDA), the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA),and the KOSDAQ Listed Companies Association (KOSDAQCA) as of September,2008.According to interviews with market analysts and personnel from the exchange, thetask force is proving to be effective in the prevention of malignant rumors.●The Operation of Call CentersSeveral call centers have been put in place to receive reports on malignant rumors,with rewards provided for genuine leads on rumors that are potentially harmful andwithout grounds.The FSS is responsible for investigating the sources of rumors and monitoringpress releases, analyst reports, various investment websites, and the actualexchange floor.Corporations have been requested to actively make voluntary public re
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Oct 20, 2008
- FSC's Published Response to the Financiual Times Articles “Singking feeling” and "Runs rekindle memories of Asian crisis a deccade ago"(October 14 and 15)
- The Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service issue the following corrections, clarifications and explanations for factual errors and questionable assertions made in the October 14 Financial Times news article “Sinking feeling”Purpose of Finance Minister Kang Man-Soo’s meetings with U.S. business executives“Kang Man-Soo, finance minister, is taking his plea for dollars to Wall Street, wherehe is due to meet with executives of banks such as Citigroup and Morgan Stanley.”Minister Kang Man-Soo met with Mr. Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley,and Mr. Robert Rubin, the former Treasury Secretary, on Tuesday, October 14, fordiscussions on the global financial crisis and their market views and assessment. MinisterKang did not meet with Wall Street executives to plea for dollars as the article falselyasserted. He did not take his plea to Wall Street as the news article speculated.POSCO overseas bond offering“Posco, the steel maker, said last week it would sell $1bn of bonds overseas as part ofefforts to stabilise the won.”In a press release dated October 10, POSCO announced that it is planning a US$1 billionoversea bond offering some time in the fourth quarter this year. The press release explicitlystated that the proceeds from the bond offering would be used for future investment andoperating funds. It did not say that the proceeds would be used to stabilize the won as thenews article erroneously reported.Remarks attributed to Finance Minister Kang Man-Soo“Mr. Kang recently told a parliamentary session that ‘apart from exports,everything—including investment, consumption, employment and the currentaccount balance—is showing a trend similar to that seen during the [Asian crisis].”The quote attributed to Minister Kang appears to refer to one of the many remarks he madeat a National Assembly hearing on July 22, 2008, in response to questions on the outlookfor the economy from National Assembly members. What he obse
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Oct 17, 2008
- Corrections, Clarifications and Explanations for October 14 Financial Times News Article “Sinking feeling”
- The Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service issue the following corrections, clarifications and explanations for factual errors and questionable assertions made in the October 14 Financial Times news article “Sinking feeling.”*****Purpose of Finance Minister Kang Man-Soo’s meetings with U.S. business executives“Kang Man-Soo, finance minister, is taking his plea for dollars to Wall Street, where he is due to meet with executives of banks such as Citigroup and Morgan Stanley.”Minister Kang Man-Soo met with Mr. Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley, and Mr. Robert Rubin, the former Treasury Secretary, on Tuesday, October 14, for discussions on the global financial crisis and their market views and assessment. Minister Kang did not meet with Wall Street executives to plea for dollars as the article falsely asserted. He did not take his plea to Wall Street as the news article speculated.POSCO overseas bond offering“Posco, the steel maker, said last week it would sell $1bn of bonds overseas as part of efforts to stabilise the won.”In a press release dated October 10, POSCO announced that it is planning a US$1 billion oversea bond offering some time in the fourth quarter this year. The press release explicitly stated that the proceeds from the bond offering would be used for future investment and operating funds. It did not say that the proceeds would be used to stabilize the won as the news article erroneously reported.Remarks attributed to Finance Minister Kang Man-Soo“Mr. Kang recently told a parliamentary session that ‘apart from exports, everything—including investment, consumption, employment and the current account balance—is showing a trend similar to that seen during the [Asian crisis].”The quote attributed to Minister Kang appears to refer to one of the many remarks he made at a National Assembly hearing on July 22, 2008, in response to questions on the outlook for the economy from National Assembly m
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Oct 14, 2008
- Briefing for Analysts
- 1. Total Foreign DebtRecent debts have largely been incurred as a result of bridge-financing (based on anticipated future returns) such as currency forwards. This type of financing has different characteristics to that of liabilities incurred to finance current account deficits which were prevalent prior to the Asian Financial Crisis.As of the end of June 2008, it is estimated that $151.8 billion out of a total of $419.8 billion of foreign debt by BOK will be not be subject to any repayment burdens, and thus reduce the actual foreign debt amount to $268 billion. The exclusion of debts which are not subject to any repayment burdens will result in an actual net foreign asset amounting to $154.5 billion.The current external debt ratio as of the end of June 2008 stands at 86.1%. However, the figure falls to 54.4% when foreign bank branches are excluded, significantly reducing external debt risks.2. External Debt by Sector A. Government Sector The bulk of the government sector debt ($51.8 billion out of $63.1 billion) consists of KRW-denominated government bonds and currency stabilization bonds purchased by foreigners, for which the Korean government and the BOK has ample repayment capacity.The remainder consists of $3.3 billion in foreign currency-denominated FX equilibrium bonds, $3.4 billion in public loans, etc. (i.e. long-term external debts that pose little risk). B. Banking SectorForeign debts without any repayment burdens incurred from shipbuilders' currency hedging, etc. account for 44.6%, or approx. $93.8 billion, of the external banking sector debt. Foreign debts incurred by domestic branches of foreign banks from their headquarters abroad are very low-risk compared with those of Korean banks.* Foreign bank branches hold 43.1% of total external banking sector debts, and 57.7% of short-term debts.We are applying stringent criteria for FX liquidity to domestic banks than observed in other countries; hence, our current FX liquidity level remains stable.* Develope
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Oct 10, 2008
- Key Issues on Korean Economy
- This document is prepared with the purpose to explain the following key issues on Korean economy.- External Debt- Foreign exchange reserve- Export- Current Account Balance- Korean Banks- FX Liquidity- Policy Responses 1. External Debt □ (Size) The ratio of external debt to GDP stands at 39% as of late 2007, which is lower than that of major developed economies1) and tolerable given the size of our economy.□ (Nature) Recent growth of external debt in Korea has risen as a counterpart to hedging activities undertaken by shipbuilders and overseas investors.ㅇ This is in stark contrast to massive foreign currency short-term borrowings induced for excessive investment by Korean Chaebols that led to the 1997 financial crisis.ㅇ As of June 2008, $152 billion out of $420 billion external debt are free of repayment burden, making the size of foreign debt with repayment burden reduced to $268 billion.ㅇ In addition, 22% of the total external debt (45% of short-term external debt) belongs to local branches of foreign banks, which makes it unfitting to be regarded as net external debt.ㅇ The IMF expressed that today's foreign debt increase in Korea not as risky as in the past. (08. 6.24, IMF Annual Consultation)1) the ratio of external debt to GDP as end of 2006 : UK(394%), Germany(144%), US(85%), Japan(35%) 2. Foreign exchange reserve□ (Size) Korea holds the 6th largest foreign exchange reserve in the world, which is deemed adequate.ㅇ The size is well beyond the IMF guideline, which is a global reference for the adequate size of FX reserve.2)ㅇ The IMF(Sep.4) and Fitch(July.16), a global credit rating agency, affirmed that Korea's reserve was sufficient.□ (Composition) Korea's reserve is composed of assets with low risk such as deposits, sovereign bonds, federal agency securities and supernational bonds.ㅇ As of September 2008, the total of $240 billion reserve can be cashed in immediately.2) IMF guideline for adequate FX reserve is a total of 3-month current pa
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Oct 09, 2008
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Jun 02, 2008
- The Plan for Privatization of KDB and Establishment of KDF
- Ⅰ. Purpose◇ Privatization of KDB is not intended for restructuring of public companies. It is a progressive strategy to develop the financial industry into a new growth engine by turning it into a high value-added industry.◇ Korea Development Fund (KDF), an advanced market-friendly policy financing vehicle to be established with funds from KDB's privatization, will support promising SMEs. - The privatization initiative provides the optimal solution to realizing the national agenda of nurturing a competitive CIB (corporate and investment bank).ㅇ By combining KDB, which has a strong corporate bankingcapacity, with Daewoo Securities, Korea's leadingsecurities house, the foundation will be laid to secure a competitive investment bank.ㅇ Advancement of innovative value-added industries will take place by securing a competitive investment bank, which will act as a core intermediary of the capital market.* An investment bank that provides risk capital to innovative industries, which will be central to the future Korean economy, is a must. - The privatization of KDB will trigger reorganizationand further advancement of the financial industry.ㅇ Domestic financial institutions typically stay complacent in the limited domestic market, maintaining their retail banking-focused revenue structure.* Currently, competitiveness of domestic banks and securities firms is limited as they concentrate on retail-banking and brokerage fees, respectively.* Overseas assets of leading global investment banks are over 50% of their total assets (e.g. Citi: 51%, HSBC: 56%, UBS: 91%). Yet, the average figure for domestic banks in 2006 was only 2.5%.ㅇ KDBH itself will actively seek MA opportunities to develop into a global investment bank through diversification of revenue structure and expansion of overseas business. By presenting new business models, it will act as a benchmark for other financial institutions. ⇨ This will provide domestic financial institutions with a new impetus a
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Oct 23, 2007
- FSC/FSS Announces "Roadmap for Advanced Financial Supervision" Aimed at Taking Korea’s Financial Supervision to the Next Level
- The Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service announced the formation of Committee for Advanced Financial Supervision jointly headed by Chairman/Governor Kim Yong-Duk and Vice President Choi Woon-Youl of Sogang University and the release of “Roadmap for Advanced Financial Supervision” following the Committee’s first meeting on October 22. The roadmap is a product of a public-private sector collaboration involving the FSC/FSS and 30 private sector representatives and experts from the academia, research institutes, the financial services industry, and civic organizations.The roadmap was initiated with the acknowledgement that the supervisory system— including the traditional approaches and practices—as well as the supervisory authorities’ organizational structure and human resources management has not satisfactorily kept up with the demands of the rapidly evolving market and is thus in need of change. The announcement of the roadmap, which coincides with the tenth anniversary of the creation of the FSS as a fully integrated financial supervisory authority, also comes amid a growing recognition that next three years may well prove pivotal for Korea’s prospect for emergence as Northeast Asia’s financial hub.Key Objectives under the RoadmapThe roadmap consists of five key policy objectives with 100 tasks (grouped into 12 areas) to be completed within the next three years as well as 30 performance measurement indices. The five key policy objectives outlined in the roadmap are (1) a fundamental shift in financial supervision, (2) responsive supervision, (3) support for business autonomy and innovation of financial institutions, (4) consumer and investor protection, and (5) confidence and trust in financial supervisory authorities.1. A Fundamental Shift in Financial SupervisionA fundamental shift and reorientation of financial supervision will be pursued. Currently, financial supervision takes a highly specific, rule-based approa
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May 17, 2007
