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May 19, 2010
- FSC Chairman's Speech - Korea Economic Forum
- Ⅰ. GreetingsGood morning, ladies and gentlemen!I would like to begin with my thanks to Mr. Song Philho, CEO of JoongAng Ilbo, Mr. Lho Cholsoo, publisher of JoongAng Daily, and Mr. Chung Ki-young, president of Samsung Economic Research Institute, for inviting me to speak at today’s forum.I also wish to acknowledge and thank honorable ambassadors, business leaders, and members of the foreign press who are with us today.The global financial crisis, unprecedented in both scale and scope, now appears to have run its course.Troubling new developments in the euro-zone economies, however, remind us that there are still many post-crisis uncertainties we must contend with.So, once again, we must wonder where the euro-zone crisis is headed, and what impact, if any, it may have on Korea’s financial markets and the economy.And it is my hope that today’s forum will shed new light on some of the questions that are on everyone’s mind.This morning, I would like to use my time to outline major financial policy issues we confront and tasks that lie ahead.Ⅱ. Korea’s Financial Policy: Current Issues TasksThere is no question that the global financial crisis forced us to reflect on our past and take stock of what went wrong.The crisis was, in many ways, a heavy blow to our conventional wisdom: namely, a blind faith in market efficiency, innovation and risk-taking.Now, with the benefit of hindsight, the international community is working to introduce wide-ranging financial regulatory reform measures.I believe we must prepare wisely for what lies ahead and maintain our vigilance on changes that are unfolding in the global financial environment.For our part, we are going to formulate financial policies within the context of the new global financial order with a focus on enhancing Korea’s financial capabilities.Addressing Destabilizing FactorsFirst and foremost, we will continue to respond swiftly and preemptively to destabilizing market developments to put out the fire befor
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Jan 11, 2010
- Progress on Improving Banks' Corporate Governance
- The global financial crisis has shed light on the importance of corporate governance in financial institutions. In particular, banks have been the major beneficiaries of government relief programs* such as government guarantee for bank deposits and foreign debts. However, as the OECD and the BCBS noted, banks’ board of directors often neglected their social responsibility by failing in risk management, pursuing short-term profits, and paying out excessive compensation. Against this backdrop, improving corporate governance in financial institutions, particularly in the banking sector, is being actively discussed at the global level. Direct financial regulations may bring about side effects by undermining financial inter-mediation and adding burden to financial consumers. In contrast, improving corporate governance minimizes the side effects and restores the public trust i n financial institutions to ensure that the financial sector can support the real economy and prevent the recurrence of crisis.An overview of global discussions1. OECDThe OECD reports, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Feb. 2009) and The Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages (June 2009), assert that corporate governance in financial institutions should be improved, citing that the boards of directors, particularly outside directors, involve problems such as the pursuit of short-term oriented profit, the payment of excessive compensation, and the failure of risk management, and also citing that the current system doe s not give shareholders enough power to hold the management in check. To address these weaknesses, the OECD is working with the FSB to publish a set of recommendations on improving corporate governance, Strategic Response to the Financial Crisis.2. U.K.Since the Turner Review point ed out the need to improve corporate governance, Sir David Walker has led an independent review of corporate governance in the UK banking ind
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Dec 30, 2009
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Dec 16, 2009
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Dec 09, 2009
- AMCHAM Luncheon Speech
- Ⅰ. Introductory RemarksThank you, Mr. Chairman, for the warm welcome.Members of the American Chamber of Commerce, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen!I am delighted to speak to you today, and I thank Chairman David Ruch and President Amy Jackson for arranging this very special gathering.I am also pleased to meet members of the U.S. business community here in Korea who joined us today.Most of all, as a representative of the Korean government, I thank AMCHAM for its commitment and dedication to advancing economic ties between the U.S. and Korea.I express my confidence that AMCHAM will continue to serve as a vital link that unites us and enhances our partnership.Ladies and gentlemen!I think it's fair to say that this year has truly been a wild ride.Now, the end of 2009 is almost upon us, and a new year is just around the corner.Today, I will use this occasion to look back at the major economic and financial policies put in place this year, and explore the tasks ahead of us.Let me first quickly review some of the recent economic and financial market trends.Ⅱ . Recent Economic and Financial Market TrendsThe global economy fell into a severe recession in 2009 as a result of a financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers.But this was also a year of renewed optimism as the global economy hit the bottom and started to move into a recovery phase.Fortunately as well, the Korean economy bounced back quite rapidly in the first half of 2009.And this momentum continued into the second half, as the economy grew 3.2% over the previous period in the third quarter.In fact, the OECD recently declared Korea to be the fastest recovering economy among its members and revised upward its growth outlook for Korea.Korea's financial markets also rapidly returned to normal from the first half on the back of more upbeat growth prospect and global financial market stability.Key financial market indicators, including stock prices and CDS spreads, have also returned
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Dec 03, 2009
- UBS Korea CEO/CFO Forum 2009 Luncheon Speech
- Ⅰ. Introductory RemarksGood afternoon, ladies and gentlemen!Let me first thank Mr. Jae-hong Lee and Mr. Young Chang of UBS Korea for having me here today.It is also a great pleasure to see so many distinguished business leaders and investors together in one place.We are now coming to the end of 2009, and winter is almost upon us.It has been a year of both despair and hope.But, fortunately, this time around, we are not going to go through the bitter cold we had to bear at the height of the financial crisis last winter.The global economy has been gradually emerging from the panic of a year ago and there is hope ahead.Yet, new concerns, such as fears of another asset bubble and major economies' swelling fiscal deficits, are clouding the outlook for the world economy.In this context, I shall speak today about how the crisis has affected Korea and what the future tasks are for the Korean government.Ⅱ . Lessons from the Global Financial CrisisNow, many wonder what has been the secret behind Korea's vigorous recovery from the crisis.I would say that one unique contributing factor is our experience with a financial crisis a decade ago.This put Korea’s corporate and financial sectors in strong shape and enhanced the government's ability to manage the crisis.And yet, the latest crisis demonstrated that our past experience did not entirely work in our favor.Let me explain.The origin of the 1997 crisis can be traced to internal distortions and distresses built up during decades of rapid economic growth. In contrast, the latest crisis originated from outside Korea.Unlike the major economies that suffered from massive financial implosions, the Korean economy was on a firm footing with healthy corporate and financial sectors.Despite this, the impact of the crisis on Korea was disproportionately large because of the stigma from the 1997 crisis.Some overseas media and investors oddly took the view that a second financial crisis could occur in Korea.This sparked negative percep
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Nov 19, 2009
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Jul 16, 2009
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Jul 10, 2009
- Plans to Advance Financial Infrastructure of Funds Market
- Background IssuesEven as the funds market has continued growing in volume and quality, investors’ interest in funds are expected to rise further from a number of factors, such as an aging population.Among other contributing reasons, tax exemptions on overseas stocks and the need to globally diversify private assets caused assets under management to increase sharply at overseas investment funds, climbing from KRW9.1 trillion at end-2005 to KRW54.9 trillion as of June 18 this year.As the availability of asset classes for investment has increased, the variety of funds has also broadened to include real estate, special asset, derivatives and other assets in their funds.But at the same time, the financial infrastructure related to the funds market has been pointed out to have room for improvement.In a few exceptional cases, investors who held overseas investment funds and fund of funds took advantage of other beneficiary owners by buying into a fund with prior information on the direction of stock prices as funds’ base prices are based on the previous day’s closing prices.In other instances, shortfalls in the financial infrastructure related to overseas investment could erode investor confidence as a result of discrepancies in the base price of overseas investment funds.There is also a loss in efficiency as trades, settlement, and the review of assets held in overseas investment funds are conducted manually.Improvement PlansTo raise the level of confidence in the base price and improve the efficiency of fund-related systems, the financial supervisory authorities are to jointly develop the financial infrastructure of the funds market with the funds industry.To prevent buying a fund with foreknowledge in the direction of stock prices, the applicable base price of overseas investment funds and fund of funds will be changed from the current T+1 day to T+2 days. To prevent the frequent resetting of the base price, the current base price tolerance will be adjusted after
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May 20, 2009
- Short Selling Permitted on Non-Financial Stocks
- The Financial Services Commission made a decision today to start allowing short selling transactions of non-financial company stocks beginning June 1.However, for the time being, the ban on short selling for financial stocks will continue to be in effect due to volatility still lingering in the market. These stocks include stocks of banks, securities companies, and insurance companies that are traded in the Kospi and the Kosdaq markets.Furthermore, as stipulated in the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (FSCMA), naked short selling will not be permitted, but only covered short selling will be permitted.To effectively monitor and supervise the short selling activities, a Short Selling Confirmation System will be placed, as well as Short Selling Execution Guidelines. Systemic Enhancements relating to Short Selling1. Disclosure of short selling and stock borrowing information in the stock market through the Korea Exchange (KRX) and the Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA).2. Establishment of Short Selling Confirmation System (March 2009) to effectively enforce short selling regulations. Under this system, an investment broker is required to verify whether he or she has followed the short selling regulations correctly.3. The Execution Guidelines for Short Selling (May 2009) have been drawn up to introduce a concept of ‘net short position’ in order to set a clear standard of what is considered short selling and what is not. The ban on short selling of non-financial stocks will be lifted on June 1, 2009, to give ample time for investors and financial investment companies to conduct preparations.Only the financial investment companies that have completed their preparations according to the guideline measures will be allowed to start placing short sell orders and conduct brokerage transactions for clients.The FSC intends on removing the ban also on short selling of financial stocks given further signs of improvements in the markets.* Please
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May 18, 2009
- 2009 Corporate Restructuring Fund Management Plan
- Amid a global financial crisis, the government has taken a number of steps to facilitate and expedite corporate restructuring of distressed companies in order to dismiss concern of worsening financial soundness of financial institutions. In line with this effort, on May 13, the legislative bill relevant to the establishment of the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) was amended to enable the Corporate Restructuring Fund to be set up within the KAMCO. The National Assembly has previously passed a motion on providing debt service guarantees for bonds that will be issued for the envisioned KRW 40 trillion Fund throughout 2009 and 2010.Subsequently, the 2009 Corporate Restructuring Fund Management Plan will be submitted to the National Assembly in late May, after a cabinet meeting held on May 19.The planned amount for the Fund in 2009 is KRW 20.2 trillion, which is subject to changes in further economic developments, whereas the actual total bond issuance for the Fund will depend on the amount of distressed assets it needs to purchase, and prevailing market conditions. The payments for the purchase of the distressed assets will be made by bonds from the Corporate Restructuring Fund, so as to minimize the impact on the bond market. The liquidity support of KRW 120 billion for the companies experiencing temporary liquidity shortage is included in the Fund as well.The majority of the Fund, KRW 20 trillion, will be used to acquire impaired loans from financial institutions and distressed assets from companies undergoing restructuring. This will preferentially include acquisitions of KRW 4.7 trillion of financial institutions’ non-performing loans from project financings and KRW 1 trillion worth of struggling ships that are in operation.The implementation of the Corporate Restructuring Fund is expected to enhance and expedite the restructuring process to preempt deterioration of asset quality of financial institutions. Through effectively utilizing the Fund in the p
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May 15, 2009
- FSC Chairman, Dong-Soo Chin Meets Foreign Correspondents
- I. GreetingsDistinguished members of the Seoul Foreign Correspondents’ Club, and ladies and gentlemen,It’s great to be here with you and I thank you for coming.I also thank the Seoul Foreign Correspondents’ Club for helping us arrange today’s meeting and giving me a chance to speak to foreign correspondents about Korea’s policy response to the global financial crisis.It is my hope that today’s meeting will shed new light on recent market and policy developments in Korea and what you can expect going forward in terms of financial policy from the FSC.II. The Financial Crisis and Korea’s ResponsePolicymakers in the U.S. and other major countries have responded aggressively and forcefully to the global financial crisis.With many characterizing the crisis as the worst since the Great Depression, there was more than ample justification for bold policy measures.Korea’s policymakers acted in a similarly bold fashion to cushion the impact of the crisis on the financial system and the broad economy.In terms of financial policy, we had two broad goals to accomplish: safeguarding the financial markets and reinstating the financial sector as the patron for thereal economy.Safeguarding the Financial MarketsAs the financial crisis began to spread around the world, it became clear to us that we had to act swiftly on several fronts to avoid systemic risk, and maintain the stability of the financial markets.To stabilize the foreign currency market, the government provided external debt guarantees for domestic banks and signed currency swap arrangements with major countries.On the other hand, to bring back stability to the financial markets, interest rates were cut and the Bond Market Stabilization Fund was created to increase liquidity and help restore the flow of credit to the real sector.Steps were also taken to prevent market instability due to abrupt capital outflow from the short-term money market.Reinstating the Financial Sector as the Patron for the Real Eco
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Apr 30, 2009
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Apr 08, 2009
- Pre-Workout Program
- The Credit Counseling and Recovery Service (CCRS) is a nonprofit corporation aiming to support debtors in financial difficulties and regulated by the Financial Services Commission.Starting on April 13 for a limited duration of one year, the CCRS and creditor institutions will run a “Pre-Workout Program” in support of individual borrowers who are delinquent for a short term between one and three months. This plan was first announced in March 10 this year.The main objective of this initiative is to take preemptive steps against further increase in as well as protraction of household delinquents, posing a threat to hurt asset soundness of creditor financial institutions.To be qualified for the program, there are six criteria which applicants must satisfy, and they include the total debt amount limit by two creditors (under KRW 500 million), delinquency length (between 30 and 90 days), and the ratio of new credit to total existing debts (30% maximum), among others.Meanwhile, to prevent credit delinquents from taking advantage of this program by intentionally putting off repayments, the CCRS and financial institutions will soon unveil additional provisions.For further details, interested users can call (1600-5500) or email CCRC (www.ccrs.or.kr) directly.* Please refer to the attached PDF for details.
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Mar 06, 2009
- FSC Article Published in AWSJ
- By Rhee ChangyoungSEOUL—South Korea, like all other advanced economies, has inevitably been affected by the financial-market turmoil seeping the globe. Yet the precise nature of these effects on our economy has too often been misunderstood. Some commentators claim that Korea is facing another major financial crisis similar to what it experienced during the Asian financial crisis. This is untrue, and it is important to set the record straight.The Korean economy is often inaccurately characterized as weak because of its external debt. It is true that Korea’s total external debt up for repayment within 2009 is $194 billion. But $39 billion of that amount is considered non-obligatory debt, such as foreign-exchange hedging and advanced payment receipts for ship orders that will clear off the books when the ships are delivered. Korea’s net external debt totals $155 billion, or 77% of Korea’s foreign reserves of $201.5 billion as of last month. The current roll-over ratio of foreign debt as of February is over 91%. Inother words, our banks and corporations are experiencing no problems repaying or refinancing their debts. Looking at the banking sector alone, out of total external debt of $171.7 billion as of the end of 2008, debt held by branches of foreign banks accounts for $72.3 billion, which does not affect the solvency of domestic banks. The actual amount of external debt held by domestic banks as of the end of 2008 is $99.4 billion—only half of Korea’s foreign reserves.Nonetheless, some market commentators have openly expressed their pessimism. Perhaps such pessimism might be traced back to Korea’s 1997 crisis and the fear that it may be repeated. Such a possibility, however, is slim. The Korean economy today is very different from what it was a decade ago.First, the corporate sector whose debts helped trigger the Asian financial crisis in Korea has been transformed, and is now sound and transparent. The ratio of corporate debt to equity, for instance,
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Jan 28, 2009
- Understanding Korean Economy (FAQs)
- Q1: How has Korea reacted to the economic difficulties so far?A: The Korean government has worked on expansionary liquidity supply of USD55 billion, tax reduction of USD35 billion, and increased fiscal expenditure of USD16 billion.The Korean government has taken preventive, decisive and sufficient policy measures to get out of the global economic turmoil. The measures mainly cover liquidity supply, FX market stabilization, and tax reduction and expansionary fiscal expenditure. To provide more liquidity in the market and lower interest rates, the Bank of Korea lowered a benchmark interest rate four times by 225bp from 5.25 percent to 3.00 percent. Also, the government has supplied the liquidity of KWR19,500 billion through RP purchases and credit limit raise for small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs).Foreign liquidity supply of USD55 billion will have been provided with USD37.6 billion already provided by the end of Dec. ’08. Currency swap arrangements with the US, Japan, and China, amounting to USD30 billion each, have been completed along with the IMF Short-term Liquidity Facility of USD22 billion fixed. The government guarantee on banks’ borrowing in foreign currencies will total USD100 billion.A total of USD35 billion tax reduction will have been implemented from ’08 to ’12 through an oil tax rebate and income/corporate tax reduction. Additional budgets of USD16 billion will have been allocated from ’08 to ’09, which are earmarked for overcoming economic difficulties including high energy prices.Deregulations to boost corporate investment, various job maintenance efforts such as promoting employment of female, the young and old, and social safety net reinforcement are among other measures the Korean government has taken.Q2: What are the key economic policies for 2009? A: The key economic polices for 2009 can be summarized as preparation for the future and job creation. The Korean government will take offensive measures to revitalize the economy a
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Jan 20, 2009
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Dec 30, 2008
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Dec 09, 2008
- Direction and Process of Corporate Restructuring
- BackgroundKorea’s financial markets have not been immune from the uncertainties prevailing in the global financial markets as the credit freeze and financial institutions loses continue to grow amid concerns that it would further deteriorate corporate liquidity and slowdown the real economy.A process that clearly sets out how the restructuring will be carried out and who it will affect would address the anxiety and uncertainty plaguing the markets through prompt and orderly restructuring.Restructuring DirectionCorporate restructuring will have a focus on saving companies, even though resolution would follow quickly for those companies deemed to be non-viable. Although industry-wide restructuring is not being ruled out, unlike the financial crisis in the late 1990s the current restructuring will center on individual companies and large business groups. Restructuring will commence alongside financial support for companies that are currently on the Fast Track or workout programs as a result of the temporary squeeze in liquidity.Restructuring ProcessCorporate restructuring will proceed under the discretion of the creditor financial institutions, but the Corporate Credit Support Task Force, the Council of Creditor Financial Institutions, and the Creditor Financial Institutions Steering Committee will also bear a part of the responsibilities along with the government.To lend support and add efficiency to the restructuring process, the FSC/FSS launched the Corporate Credit Support Task Force on November 28, 2008 and is now headed by the governor of the FSS.The Council of Creditor Financial Institutions is comprised of each respective company’s major creditor bank and others, which will discuss and decide restructuring process upon convening Council meetings. The creditor banks will categorize companies into four groups with A being normal, B temporary liquidity shortage, C distressed, and D in receivership. The major creditor banks will work through the Council of Cred
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Nov 25, 2008
- The Global Financial Crisis & Korea’s Policy Response
- IGE/IMF International Conference Luncheon RemarksThe Global Financial Crisis Korea’s Policy ResponseDr. Jun Kwang-Woo Chairman Financial Services CommissionGREETINGSDistinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen,I am delighted to be with you this afternoon, and I thank IGE Chairman Kim Pyung-Joo and President Lee Young-Tak and Dr. Mahmood Pradhan from the IMF for organizing today’s conference and inviting me to speak. I also thank speakers and distinguished participants who are with us today.In light of the deepening distress in the global financial markets, today’s conference, entitled “Lessons from the Recent Global Financial Crisis: Its Implications for the World and Korea,” is both timely and of great interest to every one of us.So I am glad to join you and share with you my perspectives on how the financial crisis emerged, what lessons we can draw from it, and where we go from here. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS KOREAN ECONOMYThe global financial crisis started with collapsing asset prices followed by a debilitating credit crunch. Expansive monetary policy by the U.S. Federal Reserve since 2001 and a surge in foreign capital inflow since 2004 kept interest rates at record low levels.Financial deregulation also swept across the major developed countries beginning in the 1980s. During this time, capital market liberalization also picked up the pace among the emerging countries.This process ultimately led to sharp increases in financial institutions’ leveraged activities and asset inflation. In particular, as financial institutions increasingly employed aggressive asset securitization and complex derivatives to sustain high profit growth, a host of new risks began to weigh on the financial system. For their part, regulators did not fully grasp the situation and preempt the risks. And the global nature of the financial system meant that the systemic risks would be felt and shared by markets around the world.Domestic financial marketsWe are now getting clear i
