Press Releases - Financial Services Commission

Press Releases

Period: start
~
end

1month 3month Reset

Requirement

May 31, 2012

FSB Plenary Meeting in Hong Kong

The FSC Vice Chairman Choo Kyungho attended the Financial Stability Board (FSB) plenary meeting held in Hong Kong from May 29 to May 30. At the meeting, financial regulators from 24 FSB member countries and international standard-setting bodies reviewed progress in financial regulatory reform and coordinated their opinions ahead of the Los Cabos G20 Summit to be held from June 16 to June 19.KEY DISCUSSIONS1. Vulnerabilities in the financial systemIn the euro area, the adverse feedback loop between sovereign debt strains, weak economic growth and fragile banking systems has intensified. There has been a pull-back in cross-border financial activity. Against this backdrop, risks of adverse spillovers to global financial markets and economies have increased.The FSB supports the work of European and national authorities to lower short-term risks and foster lasting confidence and stability, including completing the repair and restructuring of some banks as required. In addition, authorities agreed to work together to minimize the downside risks from the ongoing process of bank deleveraging.2. Addressing systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)The FSB endorsed the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) consultation paper that sets out a proposed methodology for assessing the global systemic importance of insurance companies.The FSB evaluated progress in implementing its Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. FSB members reaffirmed the need for further work to establish international guidance on common terms for information sharing and on the handling of client assets in resolution.3. Over-the-counter (OTC) derivativesThe FSB noted that substantial progress has been made in setting international standards, in advancing legislation and regulations by a number of jurisdictions. However, the FSB recognized that the current momentum should be maintained as much work remains to be done to complete the reforms by
Attachment 1
Mar 12, 2012

Reporting System of High-Volume Short Sales

BACKGROUNDSince the global financial crisis, major economies have adopted a reporting regime for high-volume short sales in line with global discussions* to enhance transparency of short selling.*Principles for Short Selling Regulation proposed by the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) on June 2009.n Provide ready access to information on short selling to improve insight into market dynamics;n Deter market abuse;n Mitigate the potential disorderly market effects of aggressive short selling;n Provide early warning signs of a build-up of large short positions and alerts to prompt investigation into suspicious activities that may be potentially abusive or disruptive to the orderly functioning or stability of the markets; andn Provide evidentiary proof that aids in post-event investigation and disciplinary action.By introducing a reporting regime for large short positions, Korea will also join the global effort to expand a pool of information for market supervision and maintain the orderly functioning or stability of the markets.We will continue to reflect global discussions and advanced markets’ regulatory reforms in domestic regulations on short selling in order to make them more compatible with global principles.KEY CONTENTIt will become mandatory for investors to report short positions that exceed a certain threshold to both market authorities and KRX.The Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (FSCMA)*will be revised to lay a legal foundation for mandatory reporting of large short positions*Article 180 of the FSCMA prohibits short sales in principle and exceptionally allows covered short selling in a manner prescribed by the Enforcement Decree.*Please read the attached file for details.
Attachment 1
Mar 06, 2012

Plan for Improving Loan Approval Process for SMEs

BACKGROUNDSmall and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) primarily rely on indirect financing such as bank loans due to difficulties in funding their business through direct financing sources such as corporate bonds.1. However, one of the most important elements that financial institutions consider in reviewing a company’s loan application is whether the company can provide collateral for loans; therefore, start-up businesses or SMEs which lack such collateral still have difficulties in borrowing money from banks. Bank officials hold on to such collateral-based standards in reviewing SMEs’ loan applications because they want to avoid their responsibility in the event of SME borrowers’ default.2. Banks also complain of insufficient information about SMEs available in a timely manner to evaluate SMEs’ loan applications. SMEs raise the issue of fairness with banks’ evaluation system of real estate collateral, pointing out that each bank’s different standards make it harder to ensure objective and reliable evaluations of collateral assets.3. The government and policy banks already have various programs to support SMEs; however, such programs are not well known to SMEs so they are not fully utilized.Against this backdrop, the FSC has come up with a set of plans to improve the loan approval process for SMEs by reforming the immunity system for bank officials; fostering an SME-specialized credit bureau (CB); and improving banks’ collateral evaluation system.MAJOR TASKSI. Reform the immunity system for bank officials1. Current situation(1) The financial supervisory authorities have made several reforms to the immunity system in order to stimulate bank lending to SMEs; however, such measures fell short of a permanent reform of the system.Since 2006, an average of 145 officials per bank annually has been sanctioned for approving SME loans that later turned into non-performing ones.(2) Currently, conditions for granting immunity set by both the supervisory authorities
Attachment 1
Nov 08, 2011

FSC Lifts Temporary Ban on Short Selling of Non-Financial Stocks

The FSC decided to lift a three-month ban (August 10 - November 9) on short selling of non-financial stocks from November 10, while maintaining the ban on financial stocks for a while.Stock market volatility has been considerably subdued since August when the financial market turmoil began to unfold.** KOSPI: 2,172 (Aug.1) →1,801 (Aug. 9, short-selling ban) →1,653 (Sept. 26) → 1,919(Nov.7)However, given that potential Eurozone risks still remain such as a possibility of Greek default, growing concerns about Italy’s debt crisis, and upcoming maturity dates of PIIGS sovereign debt,* the FSC decided to maintain the short-selling ban on financial stocks vulnerable to internal and external factors.* PIIGS sovereign debt to be matured (unit: $100 million): 1,843 (4Q2011), 2,832 (1Q2012), 1,769 (2Q2012)In August, Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium also banned short sales; however, Greece is the only country that banned short selling of all listed stocks as we did. The remaining four countries imposed short-selling bans on a few number of financial stocks.*Please read the attached file for details.
Attachment 1
Nov 04, 2011

Revision of Regulation on Investigation of Capital Markets

The FSC approved a revision of Regulation on Investigation of Capital Markets at its 18th regular meeting held on November 4, 2011.KEY CONTENTS1. Standards for punitive measures against violations of public disclosure rules get more streamlined and clarified.- Standards for imposition of penalty surcharges, which used to be too complicated, were revised in order to secure predictability and stability in enforcing such measures.* For example, the process of calculating the amount of penalty surcharges to be imposed has become shortened from six to four stages, and standards for setting the amount of penalty surcharges has become clarified in order to prevent penalty surcharges from being imposed arbitrarily.- Conditions to impose restrictions on securities issuance for those who violated public disclosure rules,* which used to be under the FSS Work Guidelines, will be incorporated into Regulation on Investigation of Capital Markets.* Cases in which the entity in violation of public disclosure was deemed incapable of paying penalty surcharges due to its delisting2. Punitive measures against those who committed a serious violation of public disclosure rules are strengthened.- The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) can accuse those who committed embezzlement or a breach of trust or repeated and intended violations of serious violations of public disclosure rules.* Please read the attached file for details.
Attachment 1
Oct 21, 2011

Plan for Improved Discretionary Investment Services

BACKGROUNDSince 2010, with socio-economic changes such as the aging population and low-interest rate trends, there has been growing demand for “discretionary investment services,” or customized services in asset management.The growth in demand for discretionary investment services appears to be driven by investors seeking for alternative investments as investors’ sentiment about fund investment was dampened and interest rates have been kept low since the global financial crisis.In particular, advisory wrap accounts have shown a significant increase in contract volumes.*Contract volumes (trillion won): 1.1 (April 2010)→5.2 (Dec. 2010) → 9.1 (June 2011)Despite such growth in size, discretionary investment services still fall short of expectations in terms of providing customized services and investor protection.① (Regulatory arbitrage) The reason discretionary investment service providers are given greater autonomy* in their operations is because of the assumption that they provide customized one-on-one services; however, they are only required to meet the same level of “know-your-client” (KYC) requirements with other regular financial investment products.*Discretionary investment services are not subject to the 10% portfolio investment rule applied to mutual funds.② (Collective management) There is a controversy about collective management as some wrap accounts are managed under one model portfolio and perceived as just a short-term investment product rather than a customized asset allocation service.③ (Investor protection) As discretionary investment services mostly just employ short-term equity investment strategies focused on a few number of stocks, there is a need for investor protection against increased market volatility.Against this backdrop, the FSC has come up with a plan for further improvements in discretionary investment services as one of mid-and-long term asset management services.KEY CONTENTSI. Strengthened requirements for customiz
Attachment 1
Sep 27, 2011

Revision of Enforcement Decree of FSCMA Approved at Cabinet Meeting

BACKGROUNDThe proposed revision of the Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (FSCMA), aimed at introducing home-grown hedge funds (tentatively named “specialized private equity funds”) to Korea’s capital markets, was approved at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, September 27, 2011.KEY CONTENTS OF THE REVISIONI. Creation of Hedge Funds1. The scope of hedge fund investors will be extended to individuals with risk-taking capability. (Article 271-2①)Currently, investments in private equity funds are allowed only to a limited number of “qualified investors” such as financial firms and pension funds. However, in order to provide more diverse investment opportunities, the revision will allow individuals who can invest KRW 500 million or more to join a hedge fund.2. The revision will bring about greater autonomy and creativity in asset management. (Article 271-2①②, Article 80⑥)(1) The requirement that private equity funds should invest more than 50% of their investments into companies under restructuring programs will be abolished so that hedge funds can invest in a wider range of assets such as securities, derivatives, and commodities.(2) Restrictions on leverage* and derivatives trading** will be eased so that hedge funds can employ more diverse investment strategies such as short selling and leverage.* Limits on leverage will be eased from 300% of fund assets to 400%.**Investments in derivatives, currently limited to 100% of fund assets in estimated maximum losses, will be allowed up to 400%, equivalent to restrictions currently applied to general private equity funds.3. A new category, “hybrid asset funds,” will be created for approval of hedge fund operations. Asset managers, securities firms and investment advisory firms that meet requirements* in equity capital, track record and expert fund managers will be given approval for hedge fund operations.(i) Hedge funds under the category of “hybrid asset funds
Attachment 1
Aug 09, 2011

Temporary Ban on Short Selling

The Korean stock market has declined for six consecutive days since August 2, amid growing concerns over the possibility of U.S. economic recession and spreading of the European fiscal crisis.*KOSPI: 2172.31p (Aug. 1) → 1801.35p (Aug. 9), ∆370.96p (∆ 17.1%)In particular, over two days from August 8 to 9, the KOSPI has dropped 142.4 points, or7.44 % as the aftershock of the downgrade of the U.S. sovereign rating significantly increased volatility in the market.*There were the 5-minute suspensions of trading in the KOSPI market (“sidecars”) and the 20-minute suspensions of the Kosdaq market (“circuit breakers”) for two consecutive days.Short sales are significantly increasing in the falling markets, spreading market anxiety. The amount of short sales, which was KRW100 billion per day on average in the first half of this year, has recently surged over KRW 400 billion, exceeding the previous record high of KRW 234.6 billion since September 2008. Short sellers are mostly foreigners and institutions. From August 2 to 5, they sold an average of KRW 314.7 billion per day in short selling, accounting for 96.7% of the total short-selling transactions.Against this backdrop, the FSC has decided to temporarily ban short selling of all listed stocks in the Korea Exchange and Kosdaq markets for three months from August 10 to November 9.* In response to the global financial crisis in 2008, the FSC banned short selling of all listed stocks, starting October 1, 2008; and lifted the ban on non-financial stocks from June 1, 2009, while keeping the ban on financial stocks.During the same period of the three months, the FSC will temporarily ease restrictions on the amount of equities that securities issuers can buy back their own.* Please read the attached file for details.
Attachment 1
Jul 26, 2011

Revision Bill of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act

BACKGROUNDThe Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (“FSCMA”) was established in 2007 as a comprehensive overhaul of capital markets regulations in order to promote autonomy and innovation in capital markets.Since the FSCMA took effect in February 2009, however, we had to weather the impacts of the global financial crisis. As a result, we still fell short of bringing about innovative changes that we initially intended with the enactment of the FSCMA such as creation of globally competitive investment banks (IBs).Meanwhile, after the financial crisis, global discussions on strengthening financial regulations and global coordination have been underway; and now is the time for us to domestically carry out what we have discussed at the global level.Against this backdrop, we see this is the right time to lay the foundation for the future of Korea’s financial industry, while coping with current global and domestic financial issues (e.g. Europe’s fiscal crisis, Korea’s household debts).The FSC has drafted a revision bill of the FSCMA, made public for 20 days from July 27 to August 16.KEY REVISIONS TO THE FSCMAI. Development of Korean IBsFor the development of home-grown investment banks capable of financing new growth industries and large overseas projects,1. Securities companies that meet certain statutory requirements such as equity capital and risk* management capability will be qualified as investment banks (or “comprehensive financial investment services providers”).*Given that securities companies can start prime brokerage services just with a revision of the FSCMA Enforcement Decree, the minimum amount of equity capital for a security firm to provide investment banking services will be set at 3 trillion won, which could be further raised later depending on developments after the revision of the FSCMA.2. The revision bill has regulations on corporate lending, internalization of order execution in place in order to help IBs provide a comp
Attachment 1
Jul 04, 2011

Plans for the Soundness of Savings Banks' Management

CURRENT CONDITIONS OF SAVINGS BANKS(Assets) As of end-March 2011, total assets of 98 mutual savings banks in operation were KRW74 trillion, down 2% from KRW75.5 trillion at the end of 2010.Mutual savings banks’ operations are still focused on extending real estate-related loans including PF loans, which accounts for 42.8%* of their total outstanding loans as of end-March 2011.(*cf. 44.7% at the end of 2010)(Deposits) As of end-March 2011, mutual savings banks received a total of KRW 64.4 trillion in deposits, down 2.8% from KRW66.3 trillion at the end of 2010.(Soundness) As of end-March 2011, the delinquency ratio of mutual savings banks rose to15.8%, up 1%p from 14.8% at the end of 2010, mainly due to rise in the delinquency ratio for real estate –related loans.*As of end-March 2011, the delinquency ratio for real estate loans rose to 20.4%, up 2.4%p from 18.0% at the end-December 2010.Despite incurred losses of savings banks, the BIS capital-adequacy ratio rose to 10.25%, up 0.42%p from 9.83% at the end of 2010, backed by continued efforts for recapitalization.* With losses of seven savings banks whose operations were suspended added, the BIS ratio combined would drop to around 7%. (as of end-March 2011, 7.57%, lower than 9.14% in June 2010)(Profitability) Due to the sluggish real estate market and growing competition in the retail financial sector, mutual savings banks recorded a total of KRW333.3 losses from July 2009 to June 2010; and KRW48.7 billion from July 2010 to March 2011.* From July 2010 to March 2011, 67 savings banks (68.4%) posted profits while 31savings banks (31.6%) incurred losses.PLANS TO ENHANCE THE SOUNDNESS OF SAVINGS BANKS’MANAGEMENT1. To help mutual savings banks’ “soft landing”- Additional purchase of non-performing PF loans from savings banks: As of June 20, the government purchased non-performing PF loans worth KRW1.9 trillion through the Restructuring Fund and singed an MOU with savings banks to help them normalize their oper
Attachment 1
Jun 30, 2011

Guidelines on Covered Bond Issuance

BACKGROUNDThe FSC/FSS set up guidelines on the issuance of covered bonds by banks, as one of follow-up measures to implement the Comprehensive Measures on Household Debt. The guidelines are intended to provide a framework for covered bond issuances, diversifying banks’ financing instruments and encouraging banks to offer more long-term and fixed-rate mortgage loans instead of short-term and floating-rate ones.KEY CONTENTS1. Definition of Covered BondsCovered bonds are a type of bonds backed by a cover pool of assets that the issuer provides as collateral. In the event of default, investors are guaranteed dual recourse to both the pool and the issuer.**The issuer is responsible for repaying the covered bonds and should offer investors a preferential claim to the cover pool.2. Requirements for Issuance of Covered Bonds(Issuers) Covered bond issuers must be banks with the BIS ratio over 10% (as of the end of the previous fiscal year) or securitization entities created by such banks.(Issuance volume/maturity) An issuer is not permitted to issue covered bonds in excess of 4% of the issuer’s total liability. Maturities of covered bonds range from one year to 30 years.3. Requirements for Cover Assets(Cover assets) A cover pool should be composed of mortgage loans that meet certain criteria* and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC). An issuer must maintain at least 5% of the total value of outstanding issuance as excess collateral.*prime mortgage loans; mortgages of more than 120% of the value of their property; loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of less than 70%; late payments of less than 60 days, etc.(Evaluation of asset eligibility) An issuer must evaluate eligibility of cover assets on a quarterly basis and provide investors with results of the evaluations. Disqualified assets in the pool should be replaced by qualified assets.(Long-term mortgage loans with fixed rates) An issuer must ensure that the cover pool is not compo
Attachment 1
May 27, 2011

Additional Measures to Improve the Soundness of ELW Market

BACKGROUNDAs Korea’s ELW market has rapidly grown in a short period of time, problems such as overheated investment and soaring investment losses have surfaced; therefore, the FSC introduced some measures (e.g., introduction of mandatory investor orientation course, stricter assessment of LP performance and preventive measures against potential unfair trading practices) in November 2010 to create a sound market environment for ELW trading.Since the implementation of the measures above mentioned, the trading values of ELWs declined somewhat as shown below:* KRW 1.7 trillion (Aug 2010) → KRW 1.9 trillion (Sep 2010) → KRW 2.0 trillion (Oct. 2010) → KRW 1.6 trillion (Nov. 2010) → KRW 1.4 trillion (Dec 2010) → KRW 1.3 trillion (Mar 2011)* Daily average number of suspicious trading: 0.84 cases (Oct 1, 2011 ~ Dec 10, 2010) → 0.13 cases (Dec 13, 2010 ~ Feb 28, 2011)However, despite these measures, as a result of some securities companies giving a preferential treatment to scalpers (the prosecutor pointed out that some scalpers bribed the securities companies so that they could have access to dedicated lines to route their orders faster than others), concerns about the soundness of ELW market have resurfaced. Against this backdrop, and we plan to adopt the following measures.PLANS TO IMPROVE CURRENT PRACTICES RELATED TO ELW MARKET AND ORDER ROUTING SPEED◈ Basic deposit requirement will be introduced as an entry barrier to ELW market investment and existing market practices will be revised to help investors easily compare ELW prices.◈ In regard with speed of order routing, brokerages will be allowed to provide only a reasonable range of service to make sure all investors can have a stable and equal access to trading system.I. SOUNDER MARKET ENVIRONMENT FOR ELWS1. Stronger Protection for Investors A. Basic Deposit RequirementIn most of derivatives trading, investors are required to make basic deposits in addition to margins.* However, for ELWs and buying opti
Attachment 1
Apr 06, 2011

Korean Financial Market Update

1. Recent trends in the stock marketThe KOSPI index, which once fell to a low point of 1,923.30 on March 15 after the Japanese earthquake, has rebounded to a record-high of 2130.43 on April 5, renewing the highest point of 2,115.69 prior to the earthquake.The recent recovery in stock prices is mainly attributed to foreigners’ net buying based on their optimism that the Korean economy is relatively stable amid ongoing external uncertainties such as Japan’s earthquake and political turmoil in the Middle East.2. Foreign investors’ movement in Korean stock exchangeForeigners sold KRW 3.5 trillion in February, the biggest net sale by monthly basis since May 2010, but made net buying of KRW 1.2 trillion in March: notably, net buying of KRW 2.8 trillion after the Japanese earthquake.(By country)Starting this year, there has been a continued outflow of European funds (including the U.K), reflecting ongoing uncertainties in the European region. By contrasts inflows of funds from the U.S. and Asian region have been increasing since March.*As of March, the U.S made a net purchase of KRW 1.3 trillion, Singapore of KRW 0.7 trillion, China of KRW 0.2 trillion*Despite our concern of Japanese capital being pulled back, Japanese made a net purchase of KRW 155 billion instead(By fund-type)In February, all foreign investors except for Asian sovereign funds were net sellers. Starting March, however, the U.S. funds began to make net buying in large volume. Net buying by foreign investors was mostly made after Japan’s earthquake, and European investors (excluding European funds) also turned net buyers of Korean stocks.(By investment period)It has turned out more than half of foreign net buying made after the Japanese earthquake was made by short-term investors. (i.e. investment banks)*Short-term: IB with investment turnover ratio over 500%3. Grounds for foreign investors’ net buyingWithout wider spread of risk from the recent Japanese earthquake and the regional conflict in the
Attachment 1
Mar 30, 2011

Monitoring Results of Domestic Banks' Foreign Currency Financing

OverviewThe Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) have been operating an Emergency Financial Situation Room and holding Joint Financial Check-up Meetings as the need arose to monitor the effects of external risk factors such as earthquakes in Japan, unrest in the Middle East and European sovereign risk on domestic financial markets including foreign currency funding and management of domestic banking industry and foreign exchange market*.*Refer to the press release dated 13 March 2011, “Result of Emergency Financial Check-up Meeting in relation to earthquakes in Japan”Foreign currency funding in the wake of earthquakes in JapanAs of March 20, 2011, domestic banks including foreign bank branches operating in Korea raised U$248.8 billion through foreign currency borrowings and deposits, etc. They had U$214.5 billion in foreign currency-denominated assets under management in the forms of foreign currency loans, trade financing and foreign currency securities, etc.Since earthquakes in Japan on 11 March 2011, foreign currency funding*, mostly through foreign currency borrowings, increased by U$1 billion and foreign currency management** increased by U $2.6 billion. The increase of U$1 billion in foreign currency funding since March 11 mostly resulted from domestic banks raising more foreign currency funds.* U$1.8 billion up in foreign currency borrowings, U$800 million down in foreign currency deposits **U$1 billion up in foreign currency loans, U$1 billion up in trade financing, U$600 million up in foreign currency securitiesAn FSS survey of domestic banks and foreign bank branches conducted immediately after the earthquakes broke out in Japan found that there were no signs of capital outflows. Instead, borrowings from headquarters by domestic branches of four Japanese banks increased U$940 million from March 14 to 25 even after the breakout of earthquakes.In addition, funding conditions for domestic banks remained stable af
Attachment 1
Mar 17, 2011

Plan for Strengthened Supervision on MSBs

The FSC has announced its plan for strengthened supervision on savings banks.Key Contents1. To prevent moral hazard of savings banks’ largest shareholdersMany of savings banks’ largest shareholders fall short of funding capability and social credibility and thus many savings banks have been vulnerable to improper practices by their largest shareholders. Therefore, the FSC plans to tighten its regulatory oversight on the biggest shareholders and hold them more accountable for savings banks’ business operations.2. To curb excessive business expansion of savings banks and promote their soundnessWhile savings banks have been engaged in disproportionate investment in high-risk assets and excessive businesses expansion, prudential regulations on them remained loose. In order to promote the soundness of savings banks, the FSC will end preferential treatment in loan caps for some savings banks and strengthen supervision on affiliated savings banks.3. To enhance investor protectionThere have been many claims that investors suffered from lack of transparency in accounting and contracts made based on incomplete information. Therefore, the FSC will better protect investors by strengthening market disciplines and curbing subordinated bond issuance by savings banks.4. To strengthen supervision over the cause of insolvencyThe FSC will closely work with related government agencies to seek civil and criminal charges against savings banks’ largest shareholders and management if they were found responsible for any business failure and misconduct.Details1. To prevent moral hazard of savings banks’ largest shareholders1) When the biggest shareholder is alleged to commit any illegal act, the FSS will be able to launch an investigation into the largest shareholder.- Revision of the Savings Bank Act (to be submitted to the National Assembly for 3Q of 2011)2) The FSC/FSS will ask savings banks’ largest shareholders who have effective control over the management to become registe
Attachment 1
Feb 23, 2011

Unfair Trading Investigation Results and Penalties

Violation of prohibition on market manipulation through the link between spot and futures by KOSPI200 stocks and derivatives trading on November 11, 2010, a KOSPI200 options’ expiry dateCase OverviewAccording to investigation results, AAA1), who is head of Absolute Strategy Group (ASG)- Asia of Deutsche Bank AG Hong Kong Branch, DDD, who is in charge of ASG - Global of New York Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., etc. conspired with EEE, who is managing director of Global Equity Derivatives (GED) at Deutsche Securities Korea, Deutsche Bank AG’s South Korean securities unit, to manipulate market prices in Korean capital markets.They had constructed speculative derivatives positions in advance through the combination of short synthetic futures and long put options. In order to gain profit from these speculative positions, they sold KRW2.4424 trillion (US$ 2.2 billion) worth of stocks listed in the KOSPI200, which they had purchased through index arbitrage trading and held during the last year (2010), in the last ten minutes before the market closed on Nov. 11, 2010, an expiry date for KOSPI200 options.Due to these massive manipulative orders, KOSPI200 index plunged 2.79% (254.62p → 247.51p) and they gained illegal profits of KRW44.87 billion (US$ 40.5 million) from market manipulation through the link between spot and futures (options) transaction.Investigation Activities and Enforcement ProcessA joint investigation team by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and the Korea Exchange (KRX) was organized to commence an investigation on Nov. 12, 2010, the next day on which the incident occurred.- Investigation team members: five staffs in Special Investigation Team of the FSS, two staffs in Review Team 3 of the KRX- In-depth investigations were carried out for about two months from Nov. 12, 2010 to Jan. 21, 2011 which included interviews with involved persons and collecting evidences at the Deutsche Bank AG Hong Kong Branch, which placed massive orders to sell, and D
Attachment 1
Feb 17, 2011

Actions Taken for Mutual Savings Banks

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) held a provisional meeting today and decided to impose 6-month business suspensions for Busan Savings Bank and Daejeon Savings Bank.Busan Savings Bank is affiliated with four other banks: Busan Central Savings Bank; Busan 2 Savings Bank; Daejeon Savings Bank; and Jeonju Savings Bank.Following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and subsequent real estate recession, financial health of the five savings banks has deteriorated, and as of end-December 2010, Busan Savings Bank’s BIS ratio has fallen to 5.13% while the outstanding liabilities surpass total assets by KRW 21.6 billion resulting in negative equity. Daejeon Savings Bank’s current BIS ratio is -3.18% and its liabilities surpass its assets by KRW 32.3 billion.Daejeon Savings Bank has experienced continued withdrawals of its deposits since D cember2010 and after judging that it is no longer able to payout anymore deposits, it has submitted a formal request for a business suspension to the FSC on February 16, 2011.The FSS plans to start a full investigation today on the suspended savings banks, and actions will be taken to normalize their operations.According to the Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry, following actions are to be taken for mutual savings banks that failed to meet the 5% BIS requirement.- Below 5% - Business Improvement Recommendation- Below 3% - Business Improvement Request- Below 1% - Business Improvement OrderAside from the two suspended banks, there are five other savings banks that fall short of the 5% BIS requirement: Bohae Savings Bank; Domin Savings Bank; Woori Savings Bank; Saenuri Savings Bank; and Yes Savings Bank, of which three of them: Woori and Saenuri (state-owned) and Yes (held by KDIC) have no difficulties financially. The other two: Bohae and Domin have submitted their business normalization plans and they are making progress. Out of 104 mutual savings banks in operation, apart from the five affiliated
Attachment 1
Jan 11, 2011

Regulatory Follow-Up Measures For Nov.11 Stock Market Plunge

BackgroundThe Financial Services Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) have developed measures to improve derivatives-related trading system jointly with the Korea Exchange (KRX) and the Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) based on the investigation of risk management status of financial investment companies and a public hearing held on December 20, 2010 after the stock market plunged on an option expiry day, November 11, 2010.The latest regulatory measures are designed to prevent the recurrence of a similar event on expiry dates of futures and options contracts and mitigate risks arising from derivatives investment by institutional investors, seeking to keep capital markets sounder and more efficient.Regulators are thoroughly investigating and inspecting alleged acts of unfair trading and violations of asset management-related laws that caused a market plunge on the option expiry day and will take appropriate actions against any violation of laws.Investigation updates1. Investigation of alleged acts of unfair tradingThe FSS conducted an on-site investigation in Hong Kong in December 2010 and is currently working to determine if any act of violating the Capital Market and Financial Investment Business Act, including market manipulation, was involved.Any violation of laws will be punished according to laws, if found.2. Examination of Wise Asset ManagementRight after the option shock incident, examiners conducted a probe into Wise Asset Management from November 12 to December 3, 2010 to identify the cause of the incident and check the adequacy of derivatives fund operation and internal control system.Regulators will complete the analysis of the inspection results as soon as possible and proceed to impose sanctions against any violation, if found.3. Risk management in the financial investment industryThe FSS examined financial investment companies to check their risk management status and whether they were in compliance with the margin rul
Attachment 1
Dec 20, 2010

Macro-prudential Stability Levy

BackgroundThe Korean government plans to impose Macro-prudential Stability Levy (“the Levy”) on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities with three motivations.First, the key factor of the past two financial crises in 1997 and 2008 was sudden capital outflows following excessive capital inflows during boom periods. Like many otheremerging and developing countries with a small and open economy, Korea is highly vulnerable to changes in the global economy and sudden capital movements. Of the various capital flows, overseas borrowings are the most volatile, in particular short-term ones. The Korean government, which has reinforced macro-prudential measures toreduce volatility in capital movement within the framework of an open and liberalized economy, now decided to introduce the Levy.Second, the need to curb massive capital inflows in the form of carry trade into Korea is growing as global liquidity has been rapidly increased by Quantitative Easing measures (QE) and the exceptionally low interest rates in advanced countries. A surge of capitalinflows could lead to inflation and asset price bubbles, and a sudden reversal of such inflows could possibly result in a systemic risk.In addition, the Levy will be used as to provide liquidity when necessary to help the Korean economy cope with external shocks.The introduction of the Levy is consistent with the global trend, in particular with the communiqué of the G20 Seoul summit where the leaders have agreed on the need for design and implementation of macro-prudential measures to curb excessive capital flows. Germany, the United Kingdom and France are about to impose the financial levy from January 2011 with the aim of repairing the financial system or procuring resolution fund. Against this backdrop, the Korean government plans to adopt the Levy as a pre-emptive and precautionary measure to stabilize both financial market and economy as a whole.Key characteristics of the Levy1. ImpositionIn order to strengthen macro-pr
Attachment 1
Dec 17, 2010

Basel III QIS and Its Implications

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“the Committee”) published the results of its comprehensive quantitative impact study (QIS) on December 16, 2010 to ascertain the impact of the Basel III rules on banks’ capital adequacy, leverage and liquidity ratios. A total of 263 banks from 23 of the 27 Committee member jurisdictions participated in the study.In Korea, 8 banks submitted data for the comprehensive QIS including 5 Group 1 banks (Woori, Shinhan, Hana, KB and IBK) and 3 Group 2 banks (Nonghyup, Daegu and Busan).Capital ratios as of year-end 2009Group 1 banks’ average common equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratios under the new regime would have sharply fallen from an average gross CET1 capital ratio of 11.1% to 5.7%.This decline is mainly attributable to the new definition of capital deductions and filters not previously applied at the common equity level of Tier 1 capital. For the Group 1 banks, the reduction in CET1 capital is driven primarily by deductions of goodwill, etc.For larger banks (Group 1 banks), the change in net CET1 capital (with deductions) compared to gross CET1 capital (without deductions) amounts to -41.3%. The reduction in C ET1 capital of Group 1 banks from Korea by deductions amounts to 3.2%.In the meantime, CET 1 capital ratio of domestic banks would remain around 10.3% under the Basel III Framework, exceeding a CET1 target level of 7% (including the capital conservation buffer).Average capital ratios by banking group, in percent CET1 Tier 1 Total Change in CET 1 by deductions Gross Net Current New Current New Group 1 Average* 11.1 5.7 10.5 6.3 14.0 8.4 -41.3 Korean banks 11.3 10.3 11.1 10.4 14.7 13.5 -3.2 Group 2 Average* 10.7 7.8 9.8 8.1 12.8 10.3 -24.7 Korean banks 10.4 9.7 10.7 10.0 15.3 13.4 -1.8 *Average of banks from 23 countries Relative to a 7% CET1 level, the capital shortfall for Group 1 banks in the QIS sample is estimated to be €577 billion (KRW880 trillion) under the Basel III requirements (including the capital
Attachment 1