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Sep 25, 2012
- FSC/FSS to Tighten Rules on Commercial Papers
- BackgroundCommercial paper (CP) is an unsecured promissory note issued by companies, based only on corporate credits with no collateral backed. It is widely sold by firms for short-term funding needs as the paper requires simpler selling process than corporate bonds.CP issuance shrank temporarily after the Asian financial crisis and the credit card turmoil, but it resumed its growth trend since 2005.However, loose disclosure regulations and lack of transparency in the CP market boosted concerns over risk management and investor protection, as well as improper CP sales.The financial regulator recognized the need to find vulnerabilities in the CP market and develop measures to improve transparency and investor protection.Tighter Rules on CPThe financial regulator will tighten rules on disclosure requirement for CP in a bid to improve transparency in the CP market. It will also strengthen regulation and supervision of CP issuance and support fully-disclosed electronic trading in CPs.Currently, an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) issuer discloses trade data and credit rating on the homepage of Korea Financial Investment Association on the day of issuance.From October, an ABCP issuer will be required to disclose more information on the paper, including financial soundness of issuers, collateral assets and specification on product structuring as well as credit ratings.The regulator will push for amendments to Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, which will make it mandatory to disclose the credit rating summary on the FSS’s DART.Currently, brokerages have no reporting obligations for ABCP transactions and the regulator is limited in its ability to monitor the CP market and respond immediately. From next year, brokerages will be required to report details on ABCP transactions.In addition, one-stop inquiry system for CP issuance will be up and running from October to provide investors information including CP’s credit ratings, collateral assets and
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Sep 06, 2012
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Jul 19, 2012
- Analysis of Korea's Househod Debt and Policy Response
- BACKGROUNDKorea’s household debt has grown rapidly since the Asian financial crisis compared to the growth rate of Korea’s GDP and income, posing a potential risk to our economy. It has been also pointed out that Korea’s household debt is structurally vulnerable as household loans are mostly composed of floating-rate, lump-sum payment, and interest-only loans.Against this backdrop, the government took a set of measures to take the household debt growth under control.Last year, the ceilings on debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, temporarily eased, were reinstated in March. In June, the government took measures to curb household borrowing in the non-banking sector, while strengthening microfinance programs in order to ensure low-income households’ accessibility to financial services.Building on such measures, the government came up with a comprehensive package of measures in June 2011 to ensure a “soft landing” for the household debt risk, which includes properly managing total liquidity, improving households’ ability to repay their debt, strengthening financial institutions’ soundness, and reinforcing microfinance programs.With the recent economic slowdown and slow recovery of household income, there are limitations in taking drastic measures to curb household debt growth. There are also concerns raised about low-income or elderly borrowers’ ability to repay their loans.ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD DEBT TRENDS1. OverviewIn 2011, Korea’s household debt grew at 8.1%, slower than 8.7% in 2010; however, household debt-to-GDP ratio and household debt-to-disposable income slightly rose1 as GDP and disposable income did not grow sufficiently in 2011.However, since the second half of 2011, the growth rate of household debt has slowed down.2 In the first quarter of 2012, outstanding household loans decreased for the first time in three years since 2009.The structural weakness of household debt has also been quite improved. The ratio of fixed rate loans by banks rose fro
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Jun 21, 2012
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Apr 02, 2012
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Mar 06, 2012
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Jan 06, 2012
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Dec 14, 2011
- Early Repayment of Bank Recapitalization Fund
- OVERVIEWIn December 2008, the government announced its plan to create the Bank Recapitalization Fund in order to help banks secure more equity capital in response to the global financial crisis. A total of KRW 20 trillion fund was raised with contributions from the Bank of Korea (KRW 10 trillion), the Korea Development Bank (KRW 2 trillion), and institutional and retail investors (KRW 8 trillion) . With the fund, the government purchased banks’ subordinated and hybrid securities and then securitized subordinated debt of KRW 8 trillion into bonds and sold them to institutional investors.UPDATES ON FUND OPERATIONOn March 31, 2009, the government purchased hybrid and subordinated securities worth KRW 4 trillion from eight domestic banks.As of end-November 2011, a total of KRW 1.3 trillion was repaid. The government fully recovered its investment in banks’ subordinated debt by selling a total of KRW 503 billion* subordinated securities in the market. Out of the investment in hybrid securities, KRW 0.8 trillion** was repaid as issuers chose to buy back their debt before maturity.EARLY REPAYMENT SCHEMESome banks expressed their intention to buy back their hybrid securities before maturity as their earnings this year have increased.Such an early repayment requires approval from the Bank Recapitalization Fund Operation Committee and the FSS Governor for selling those securities before maturity.On December 9, 2011, the Committee has approved sales of hybrid securities worth KRW 1.5 trillion that the Bank Recapitalization Fund held in Kookmin (KRW 0.6 trillion), Hana (KRW 0.3 trillion), Woori (KRW 0.2 trillion), and NH Bank (KRW 1.5 trillion).These banks will go through their internal procedure such as approval from their board of directors for early repayment and then apply for approval from the FSS Governor.Through the buy-back scheme, it is expected that KRW 1.5 trillion will be repaid by the end of this year, and the remaining amount of money to be recovered will be l
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Oct 21, 2011
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Jul 26, 2011
- Revision Bill of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act
- BACKGROUNDThe Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (“FSCMA”) was established in 2007 as a comprehensive overhaul of capital markets regulations in order to promote autonomy and innovation in capital markets.Since the FSCMA took effect in February 2009, however, we had to weather the impacts of the global financial crisis. As a result, we still fell short of bringing about innovative changes that we initially intended with the enactment of the FSCMA such as creation of globally competitive investment banks (IBs).Meanwhile, after the financial crisis, global discussions on strengthening financial regulations and global coordination have been underway; and now is the time for us to domestically carry out what we have discussed at the global level.Against this backdrop, we see this is the right time to lay the foundation for the future of Korea’s financial industry, while coping with current global and domestic financial issues (e.g. Europe’s fiscal crisis, Korea’s household debts).The FSC has drafted a revision bill of the FSCMA, made public for 20 days from July 27 to August 16.KEY REVISIONS TO THE FSCMAI. Development of Korean IBsFor the development of home-grown investment banks capable of financing new growth industries and large overseas projects,1. Securities companies that meet certain statutory requirements such as equity capital and risk* management capability will be qualified as investment banks (or “comprehensive financial investment services providers”).*Given that securities companies can start prime brokerage services just with a revision of the FSCMA Enforcement Decree, the minimum amount of equity capital for a security firm to provide investment banking services will be set at 3 trillion won, which could be further raised later depending on developments after the revision of the FSCMA.2. The revision bill has regulations on corporate lending, internalization of order execution in place in order to help IBs provide a comp
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Jul 04, 2011
- Plans for the Soundness of Savings Banks' Management
- CURRENT CONDITIONS OF SAVINGS BANKS(Assets) As of end-March 2011, total assets of 98 mutual savings banks in operation were KRW74 trillion, down 2% from KRW75.5 trillion at the end of 2010.Mutual savings banks’ operations are still focused on extending real estate-related loans including PF loans, which accounts for 42.8%* of their total outstanding loans as of end-March 2011.(*cf. 44.7% at the end of 2010)(Deposits) As of end-March 2011, mutual savings banks received a total of KRW 64.4 trillion in deposits, down 2.8% from KRW66.3 trillion at the end of 2010.(Soundness) As of end-March 2011, the delinquency ratio of mutual savings banks rose to15.8%, up 1%p from 14.8% at the end of 2010, mainly due to rise in the delinquency ratio for real estate –related loans.*As of end-March 2011, the delinquency ratio for real estate loans rose to 20.4%, up 2.4%p from 18.0% at the end-December 2010.Despite incurred losses of savings banks, the BIS capital-adequacy ratio rose to 10.25%, up 0.42%p from 9.83% at the end of 2010, backed by continued efforts for recapitalization.* With losses of seven savings banks whose operations were suspended added, the BIS ratio combined would drop to around 7%. (as of end-March 2011, 7.57%, lower than 9.14% in June 2010)(Profitability) Due to the sluggish real estate market and growing competition in the retail financial sector, mutual savings banks recorded a total of KRW333.3 losses from July 2009 to June 2010; and KRW48.7 billion from July 2010 to March 2011.* From July 2010 to March 2011, 67 savings banks (68.4%) posted profits while 31savings banks (31.6%) incurred losses.PLANS TO ENHANCE THE SOUNDNESS OF SAVINGS BANKS’MANAGEMENT1. To help mutual savings banks’ “soft landing”- Additional purchase of non-performing PF loans from savings banks: As of June 20, the government purchased non-performing PF loans worth KRW1.9 trillion through the Restructuring Fund and singed an MOU with savings banks to help them normalize their oper
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Jun 30, 2011
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Jun 29, 2011
- Comprehensive Measures on Household Debt
- PROGRESS BRIEFThe government has responded to household debt problems with a series of policy measures in order to enhance the soundness of household debt and financial institutions and at the same time to ensure low-income households’ access to loans.- The application of debt-to-income (DTI) limits for mortgage loans, which had been temporarily eased until last March, was reinstated starting April.- Measures to Encourage Sound Competition among Credit Card Companies (Feb. 9); Measures to Curb Credit Card Companies from Excessively Expanding Their Businesses (June 7)- Measures to Ensure Low-Income Households’ Access to Loans (April 15)DIAGNOSIS OF THE CURRENT HOUSEHOLD DEBT LEVELSAs of end-March 2011, Korea’s household debt reached KRW 801.4 trillion with an annual growth rate of 13% on average since the Asian financial crisis, exceeding the nominal GDP growth rate of 7.3% over the same period.The growth of household debt during the post-crisis period is attributed to the combination of various factors such as low interest rates, abundant liquidity, expectations about rise in real estate prices, and excessive lending by financial institutions.With all the conditions – the soundness of household debt, the proportions of loans extended to borrowers with good credit ratings, loss-absorbing capacity of financial institutions, and household asset holdings – taken into account, we see the current levels of household debt still “broadly manageable.”However, we cannot rule out a possibility that household debt problems would turn into threats to Korea’s economy and financial markets unless we take preemptive measures; therefore, the government came up with a package of measures to contain potential risks of household debt.FINANCIAL POLICY MEASURES ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT1. Measures to keep household debt growth at a manageable paceA. For the banking sector- Apply higher BIS risk weights to high-risk mortgage loans or excessive loans disproportionately concentrated
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Mar 30, 2011
- Monitoring Results of Domestic Banks' Foreign Currency Financing
- OverviewThe Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) have been operating an Emergency Financial Situation Room and holding Joint Financial Check-up Meetings as the need arose to monitor the effects of external risk factors such as earthquakes in Japan, unrest in the Middle East and European sovereign risk on domestic financial markets including foreign currency funding and management of domestic banking industry and foreign exchange market*.*Refer to the press release dated 13 March 2011, “Result of Emergency Financial Check-up Meeting in relation to earthquakes in Japan”Foreign currency funding in the wake of earthquakes in JapanAs of March 20, 2011, domestic banks including foreign bank branches operating in Korea raised U$248.8 billion through foreign currency borrowings and deposits, etc. They had U$214.5 billion in foreign currency-denominated assets under management in the forms of foreign currency loans, trade financing and foreign currency securities, etc.Since earthquakes in Japan on 11 March 2011, foreign currency funding*, mostly through foreign currency borrowings, increased by U$1 billion and foreign currency management** increased by U $2.6 billion. The increase of U$1 billion in foreign currency funding since March 11 mostly resulted from domestic banks raising more foreign currency funds.* U$1.8 billion up in foreign currency borrowings, U$800 million down in foreign currency deposits **U$1 billion up in foreign currency loans, U$1 billion up in trade financing, U$600 million up in foreign currency securitiesAn FSS survey of domestic banks and foreign bank branches conducted immediately after the earthquakes broke out in Japan found that there were no signs of capital outflows. Instead, borrowings from headquarters by domestic branches of four Japanese banks increased U$940 million from March 14 to 25 even after the breakout of earthquakes.In addition, funding conditions for domestic banks remained stable af
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Mar 17, 2011
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Dec 17, 2010
- Basel III QIS and Its Implications
- The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“the Committee”) published the results of its comprehensive quantitative impact study (QIS) on December 16, 2010 to ascertain the impact of the Basel III rules on banks’ capital adequacy, leverage and liquidity ratios. A total of 263 banks from 23 of the 27 Committee member jurisdictions participated in the study.In Korea, 8 banks submitted data for the comprehensive QIS including 5 Group 1 banks (Woori, Shinhan, Hana, KB and IBK) and 3 Group 2 banks (Nonghyup, Daegu and Busan).Capital ratios as of year-end 2009Group 1 banks’ average common equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratios under the new regime would have sharply fallen from an average gross CET1 capital ratio of 11.1% to 5.7%.This decline is mainly attributable to the new definition of capital deductions and filters not previously applied at the common equity level of Tier 1 capital. For the Group 1 banks, the reduction in CET1 capital is driven primarily by deductions of goodwill, etc.For larger banks (Group 1 banks), the change in net CET1 capital (with deductions) compared to gross CET1 capital (without deductions) amounts to -41.3%. The reduction in C ET1 capital of Group 1 banks from Korea by deductions amounts to 3.2%.In the meantime, CET 1 capital ratio of domestic banks would remain around 10.3% under the Basel III Framework, exceeding a CET1 target level of 7% (including the capital conservation buffer).Average capital ratios by banking group, in percent CET1 Tier 1 Total Change in CET 1 by deductions Gross Net Current New Current New Group 1 Average* 11.1 5.7 10.5 6.3 14.0 8.4 -41.3 Korean banks 11.3 10.3 11.1 10.4 14.7 13.5 -3.2 Group 2 Average* 10.7 7.8 9.8 8.1 12.8 10.3 -24.7 Korean banks 10.4 9.7 10.7 10.0 15.3 13.4 -1.8 *Average of banks from 23 countries Relative to a 7% CET1 level, the capital shortfall for Group 1 banks in the QIS sample is estimated to be €577 billion (KRW880 trillion) under the Basel III requirements (including the capital
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Dec 14, 2010
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Oct 05, 2010
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Sep 02, 2010
- Stimulation Plan for Long-term KTB Futures Trade Approved by FSC
- To promote trading of long-term KTB futures, the KRX amended its Derivatives Market Business Regulation and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) approved the amended Regulation on September 1, 2010.As the follow-up of the plan for promoting long-term KTB futures that was devised jointly by the Financial Services Commission, Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KRX, the latest amendment streamlined the regulations related to KTB futures.The key amendments are 1) the harmonization of regulations governing KTB futures to ensure the balanced growth of short-term and long-term KTB futures, 2) stabilization of market operation and 3) reinforcement of market making function in the Derivatives Market.1. Harmonization of regulations governing individual KTB futuresBy minimizing the differences in the regulations applied to short-term and long-term KTB futures, it has been attempted to make easy the trade linking the short-term and long-term KTB futures contracts and enhance the accessibility of KTB futures.(1) To ensure the settlement expediency of 10-year KTB Futures, the plan is made to change the final settlement method from physical delivery to cash settlement. Accordingly, like the case of 3-year KTB Futures, the final settlement price of 10- year KTB Futures will be calculated on the basis of yield of basket bonds for final settlement and present value model for underlying bond and the final settlement day will be changed to T+1 day, i.e., the day after the last trading day, from the existing T+2 day. (2) By considering the recent market interest rate, the coupon rate of underlying bonds of 3-year and 5-year KTB Futures would be lowered to 5% per year from 8% per year in order to enhance the hedge effectiveness.(3) The plan is made to increase the trading unit of 10-year KTB Futures to KRW 100 million at par value from KRW 50 million at par value and lower the quotation unit to 0.01 from current 0.02. However, the tick value of KRW 10,000 will be kept unchanged.(4)
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Aug 02, 2010
- Plans to Enhance the Short-term Financing Market
- Current Status-quo of the Short-term Financing MarketBy short-term financing, we mean wholesale financing among financial institutions by trading or issuing under 1- year maturity products such as Calls, RPs, CPs, and CDs.An analysis of current situation by individual market sectors① (Call Market) Daily average volume of KRW 33 trillion*, which takes up about 50% of the short term financing market.* Reduced down to KRW 11 trillion level, but recently resumed to the pre-crisis level.(’08.9: KRW 29 trillion, ’09.3: KRW 11.5 trillion, ’09.12: KRW 30.2 trillion, ’10.6: KRW 33.1 trillion)② (RP) Trading volume (outstanding balance base) has been consistently growing.(’07: KRW 65 trillion, ’08: KRW 69 trillion, ’09: KRW 72 trillion). Most of the transactions (87%) are large client based.③ (CD) Dropped to KRW 79 trillion level due to the curb on Loan-to-Deposit Ratio regulation, while market trading volume has gone down to KRW 4.5 trillion daily average.Source: Bank of KoreaProblems Detected in the Short-Term Financing MarketThe overriding problem in the short-term financing market is that it is too much concentrated on the Call market which causes distortions to the market function and may entail latent systemic risk.- The convenience of Call transactions using credit based lending with high liquidity and low interest rate triggered the growing dependency of the Call market by financial institutions.- Composition of the short term financing market (as of May ’10): Call (50.5%), RP (16%), CP (17.2%), CD (16.4%) - The Call market’s function has been misled as ‘funding sources’ for the secondary financial institutions’ (e.g. securities houses and mutual savings banks) operating capital and in turn used to invest in high yielding short term KTBs.- In particular, excessive ‘call money’ by securities houses could become a source of potential systemic risk when hit by a sudden credit crunch.- The over-usage of the Call market also led to the unde
