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Jul 07, 2000
- Completion of Asset Clean-up of ITC Trust Funds (With Attachment)
- This press release is to clarify the completion of clean-up efforts regarding trust funds at domestic Investment Trust Companies (ITCs), Investment Trust Management Companies (ITMCs), and merchant banks. With implementation of the mark-to-market evaluation system for bonds, all ITCs, ITMCs and merchant banks are required to reveal bad assets, mainly bad bonds, in trust funds. Furthermore, bad assets must be duly assessed and written off in order to regain investor confidence by enhancing transparency in fund asset management. As a result, all trust funds at ITCs were evaluated and audited by outside experts as of June 30, 2000. According to the results of the evaluation and audit, all of the funds have been completely cleaned of bad assets and their current financial status has been accurately reported.The total amount of bad assets held by ITCs was estimated at 7.1 trillion won as of the end of January 2000. Of this total, it was estimated that 3.1 trillion won was to be written off or assumed as losses. As of the end June 2000, however, potential losses amounted only to 0.9 trillion won as 2.2 trillion won had already been written off. Potential losses refer to bad assets that should be recognized as losses but are not realized through write-offs. In fact, three different methods were utilized to clean up bad assets in ITC trust funds as of the end of June 2000: the write-offs of bad assets from trust accounts, transfer to sales units, i.e. securities companies, in light of burden sharing, and the securitization of bad assets through the issuance of Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBOs). As such, total bad assets were assessed from three different sources. 2.3 trillion won was held in the ITCs’ trust accounts, 0.4 trillion won was recognized as it originated from ITCs although transferred to sales units, and 4.4 trillion won arose from buying back subordinate class CBOs. First, ITCs subsequently wrote-off 1.2 trillion won, or 53.5%, of the 2.3 trillion won held
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Jul 03, 2000
- Commercial Banks Disclose Potential Losses
- On June 30, 2000, Korean commercial banks disclosed potential losses in their assets in accordance with the stricter disclosure rules of the forward looking criteria (FLC). Potential losses refer to losses that would additionally be incurred following the application of the FLC to all borrowers. As of end-March 2000, potential losses amounted to 3.9 trillion won, including those newly accrued through the end of June. In addition, commercial banks will be required to transform into “clean banks” through the swift resolution of impaired assets and reinforcement of capital bases.In this regard, the FSS announced policy measures to enhance the transparency of bank management. Under the new measures, potential losses will be reflected in banks’ income statements within the time framework agreed to with the IMF in order to promote investor confidence and to expedite completion of management normalization efforts at commercial banks. Additional injections of public funds will also be considered if deemed necessary and under the strict condition of more vigorous self-rescue efforts in place.BackgroundThe FSS introduced the FLC as the new standards for asset classification effective from December 31, 1999, in order to fully incorporate a borrowers’ capacity to repay loans. However, investor confidence has not been restored to the targeted level due mainly to market perceptions that banks remain vulnerable to unrevealed potential losses. In fact, impaired assets related to companies currently under workout programs have been given preferential treatment in the course of pursuing corporate sector restructuring. Loans extended to companies under workout programs were classified as either “precautionary” or “substandard” and are required a minimum 2 to 20 percent loan loss provisioning. Also, the FLC was not able to account for potential losses in companies under court receivership and court mediation procedures as well as losses resulting from holding secured CP
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Jul 01, 2000
- Clean-up of Bad Assets in Trust Funds of ITCs, ITMCs Completed
- With the implementation of the mark-to-market evaluation system for bonds, ITCs and ITMCs are required to reveal bad assets, mainly bad bonds, in trust funds. Furthermore, the bad assets were required to be fairly evaluated and written off in order to regain investor confidence by enhancing transparency in fund asset management. As a result, all funds at ITCs, ITMCs and merchant banks were evaluated and audited by outside experts as of June 30, 2000. According to the evaluation and audit results, all of the funds have been completely cleaned of bad assets and their financial status have been fairly stated.ITCs and ITMCs transferred bad assets from trust accounts to their own accounts and issued Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBOs), thereby sharing a major portion of the losses stemming from bad assets between IT(M)Cs and fund selling agencies. In addition, ITCs and ITMCs wrote off 1.2 trillion won of bad assets in the funds. According to the evaluation, bad assets in trust accounts totaled 2.3 trillion won and total losses were estimated at 1.2 trillion won, or 53.5 percent. The remaining 1.1 trillion won, which represents 0.8 percent of total assets in trust accounts, is expected to be collected from debtors. Bad assets were written off at ratio set under strict criteria in order to be fully account for. Write-offs were made for both Bankrupted bonds and Quasi-bankrupted Bonds, which are bonds that did not go into bankruptcy yet but were deemed so by the government. Bankrupted Bonds were written off at a ratio of above 50 percent, and Quasi-Bankrupted Bonds at a ratio of above 20 percent. Despite write-offs, fund yields were not affected, remaining at around 8 percent per annum. Funds under the mark-to-market evaluation system recorded higher yields than the funds under the book value evaluation system. In order to enhance transparency in fund management, the results of fund management such as yields on securities, amount of bad assets and write-off ratios will b
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Nov 30, 1999
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Nov 17, 1999
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Nov 04, 1999
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Sep 17, 1999
- Terms of Investment Signed for the Sale of Korea First Bank
- The Korean Government and Newbridge Capital Ltd., a U.S. investment firm, reached an agreement on the detailed terms of the transaction of Korea First Bank on September 17, 1999. This Terms of Investment is the binding agreement on major terms and conditions which will be the basis for the definite contract. They had exchanged memoranda of understanding on December 31, 1998. Both parties have expressed their interest in concluding the final contract as soon as possible.The major terms agreed are that Newbridge Capital will invest KRW 500 billion to acquire 51 percent of the shares in Korea First Bank, which are held by the Government, on the condition that the bank shareholders’ equity will be maintained at least at a level equivalent to both 3 percent of total assets and the capital required to meet BIS capital ratio of 10 percent. Newbridge Capital would also invest up to an additional KRW 200 billion in the next 2 years, subject to progress in the management rehabilitation of the bank.As premium for management rights, the Government will have a warrant exercisable on 5 percent of the total shares of the bank after 3 years, which would enable its participation in the future upside potential of the bank to any extent possible. In the meantime, the bank will be protected against losses arising from a deterioration of the existing loans in two ways. First, the Government would purchase the loans should they default during the next 2 years, or 3 years in the case of workout loans, from the closing. Second, the Government would provide the bank with additional reserves for loan losses, which may be incurred from any asset quality deterioration.Throughout the negotiation process, the Government placed an emphasis on the need to preserve the bank’s post-sale operational base and facilitate financial support for the existing corporate customers. Especially in this regard, all loans will be retained by the bank except for non-performing loans as classified according to
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Sep 03, 1999
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Aug 25, 1999
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Jun 30, 1999
- Launch of Korea Accounting Institute(KAI)
- In an effort to enhance credibility and transparency in accounting and corporate environment, the Korean government made an agreement with the IBRD in October 1998, to establish a private-sector accounting standard setting organization.In order to devise a plan for an efficient and most appropriate organizational structure under Korean climate, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) formed a steering committee including KICPA and other related institutions.On June 30, 1999, the inaugural meeting of 13 member institutions was held at the KICPA conference hall to officially launch the organization, named as the Korea Accounting Standards Institute (KASI).In addition to the approval of the articles of incorporation in the meeting, inaugural member institutions appointed the president, board of directors, and a standing board member of the Korea Accounting Standards Board (KASB).After the approval by the FSC, facility arrangement, and personnel recruiting, the KASI is expected to be fully operational soon.* Please refer to the attached file for details.
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Jun 28, 1999
- Action on Management Rehabilitation of Korea First Bank
- Based on the resolution passed by the Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”) on June 25, 1999, the Government has determined Korea First Bank (“KFB”) to be insolvent in accordance with Section 2(3) of the Act Concerning the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry. From this decision, the Government has also issued an order for capital reduction and made a request for fund support to the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (“KDIC”).Following the difficulties in management KFB experienced in its credit relations with Hanbo and Kia during 1997, the Government decided to provide support with public funds in January 1998. However, with the corporate and financial sector restructuring on their way, KFB’s financial conditions further deteriorated by the increases in non-performing loans (NPLs), which resulted from the strengthened asset classification standards, corporate bankruptcies, and the losses incurred from resolving NPLs.Furthermore, with binding constraints on its making loans and securities investment, KFB is currently unable to carry out its normal operation without any recapitalization support from outside.There are a number of considerations for the forthcoming injection of public funds into KFB for its management rehabilitation prior to its sale. In the absence of any provision for its management rehabilitation, KFB is certain to face difficulties in retaining its customers, including its corporate clients, and maintaining its operational basis.Further, since a delay in rehabilitating its management could entail a more significant amount of public funds, a prompt action had to be taken. In addition, management rehabilitation of KFB is a measure which would have had to be taken to resolve its bad assets, notwithstanding its sale overseas. Thus, it is timely and appropriate as a measure to prevent any further deterioration of its financial conditions and facilitate the negotiation of its sale. In order to maximize the valuation of KFB a
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Apr 21, 1999
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Apr 20, 1999
- Disclosure of Korean Bank`s Management Improvement Plans
- The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) will require Korean banks that have been placed under prompt corrective action measures to disclose details of their management improvement plans on their internet website. The recent measure aims at making related information readily available to varying stake holders and enhancing management accountability at the banks.Although ideally the content of plans should be disclosed in its entirety, those that are seen to be inappropriate to be made public out of concerns of any adverse effects may take a more abbreviated form. Disclosure items include plans relating to shedding subsidiaries, reducing nonperforming loans and downsizing of staff and business activities, along with management performance targets, management strategies, governance structure, macro economic forecasts etc. There are currently ten banks that are placed under prompt corrective action measures ; Hanvit, Cho Hung, Korea Exchange, Korea First, Seoul, Peace, Pusan, Kyongnam, Cheju, Kangwon.* Please refer to the attached file for details.
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Mar 05, 1999
- Restructuring the Life Insurance Sector
- In a document released on March 5, 1999, the Financial Supervisory Commission laid out the underlying scheme for restructuring the domestic life insurance sector (total assets of 92.3 trillion won as of Dec. 1998). The following summarizes some of the important features.Progress to dateInitial round of restructuring of the life insurance sector carried out in August, 1998 entailed the following measures ;- Business suspension and exit (4 cos.) ; Kukje, BYC, Taeyang, Coryo- Mandatory submission of management improvement implementation plans (7 cos.) ; Josun, Dongah, Kookmin, Hankuk, Handuk, Pacific, Doowon- Mandatory submission of LOI (7 cos.) ; Hanil, Shinhan, Hansung, Daishin, Tongyang, SK, KumhoBased on 1998 year-end results, among the 14 life insurance companies that were subject to management submission of management improvement implementation plans and LOIs, 10 companies were found to not have implemented plans as originally scheduled and were asked to promptly come up with ways to complete implementation (Jan 18 - Feb 18, 1999). It was conluded that a large number of these companies were suffering from huge losses and with deterioration in management performance of recent registered significant shortfall in solvency margin.In February, 1999 due diligence was conducted on 14 companies that were subject to further management improvement and based on these results specific companies to be placed under restructuring schemes were identified.Future TasksWithout the resolution of ailing life insurance companies, problems in the sector will only worsen and require increasingly more public funds. Although voluntary MAs within the domestic market along side takeovers by international buyers are seen as the ideal way to approach the problem, as most of the companies are under severe distress the likelihood of any voluntary consolidation is dismal and thus sell-offs to international buyers will be the main vehicle to be used.The underlying principle for the follow-up stag
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Mar 04, 1999
- Total NPLs at Korean Financial Institutions(end-1998)
- As of the end of 1998, NPLs (categorized as loans in arrears of 3 months or more, credit extended to entities under court receivership, composition etc. or cooperative assistance loan recipients) at banks and non-bank financial institutions amounted to 60.2 trillion won, representing a decrease of 3.8 trillion won from the 64 trillion won recorded at the end of September, 1998. Among the total, 33.6 trillion won come from the banking sector, whereas the remaining 26.6 trillion won were held by non-bank financial institutions.The drop in total NPLs during the fourth quarter can be attributable to efforts taken on the part of individual financial institutions as well as NPL (valuing approximately 5 trillion won) purchases made by the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO).As bankruptcy ratios have been brought down to normal levels and the economy is starting to turnaround, new NPLs are not expected to rise to substantial levels.Utilizing a forward-looking criteria, of which will replace the current asset classification standards by the end of this year, FSC expects total NPLs as at end-1998 to peak at 100-110 trillion won even under the worst case scenario.* Please refer to the attached file for details.
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Mar 03, 1999
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Feb 08, 1999
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Feb 02, 1999
- Management Improvement Measure for Chungbuk Bank
- At a meeting held at 5 p.m. on February 2nd, 1999 to deliberate matters concerning Chungbuk Bank, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) imposed a non-viable financial institution designation as well as a management improvement measure order on the subject bank. Chungbuk Bank is a regional bank with total assets of 2.6 trillion won (as of Dec., 1998) and was conditionally approved by the FSC on June 29, 1998.The management improvement measure order entails a merger order with another financial institution (as defined under the General Banking Act) to take effect on February 8, 1999. The bank has up to April 30, 1999 to complete the merger process (including a merger consent at a shareholder meeting)Following are the findings that led to the above decision ;- According to a due diligence conducted by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) utilizing data as of Dec., 1998, Chungbuk Bank showed a deficiency in net worth of 61 billion won- During 1998, Chungbuk Bank suffered from large operational losses, decrease in deposits and increase in NPLs, leading to erosion of capital and difficulties in satisfying single borrower limits as well as other statutory requirements- Considering among others the decrease in total loans of recent, Chungbuk Bank is deemed to not have been fully carrying out conventional banking functions* Please refer to the attached file for details.
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Jan 23, 1999
- Agreement Between FSC and Hanvit Bank
- On Friday, January 22, 1999, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) entered into an Agreement on Performance of Management Normalization Plan (hereinafter, Agreement) with Hanvit Bank. Hanvit Bank was officially launched on January 1 of this year as a result of a merger between Commercial Bank of Korea (CBK) and Hanil Bank and has been recapitalized last year utilizing public resources.With the understanding that the success of Hanvit Bank, being seen as a national project with high momentum, will determine the potentiality of Korean financial institutions in terms of building global competitiveness, this Agreement affirms the government's intent not to engage in Hanvit Bank's daily operations, such as personnel or budget matters unless specified otherwise under this Agreement, related laws and regulations, or when KDIC as a shareholder exercises right granted under the Commercial Code.Under the condition that Hanvit Bank faithfully performs the Management Normalization Plan, the Agreement will be terminated after two years at which point in time KDIC's aggregate shares fall below 50%. By faithfully performing this Agreement, Hanvit Bank is expected to form the foundation to surface as a leading bank through sound and autonomous management.* Please refer to the attached file for details.
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Dec 31, 1998
